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Fixing the Constable’s Blunder: 
Can One Trial Judge in One County in One State Nudge 
a Nation Beyond the Exclusionary Rule? 
H. Mitchell Caldwell ∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
The American Exclusionary Rule is like the weather; everybody 
talks about it but nobody does anything. Despite the rule’s wholesale 
damnation,1 its disproportionate windfall to the accused,2 its disregard of 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. I want to acknowledge and 
thank Janelle Dine and Andrew Robinson for their spirited and invaluable assistance with this 
Article. Additionally, I am grateful to Pepperdine University School of Law for its Summer Grant 
Program. 
 1. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757 
(1994). Amar argues, 
The Fourth Amendment today is an embarrassment. Much of what the Supreme Court 
has said in the last half century—that the Amendment generally calls for warrants and 
probable cause for all searches and seizures, and exclusion of illegally obtained 
evidence—is initially plausible but ultimately misguided. As a matter of text, history, and 
plain old common sense, these three pillars of modern Fourth Amendment case law are 
hard to support; in fact, today’s Supreme Court does not really support them. Except 
when it does. Warrants are not required—unless they are. All searches and seizures must 
be grounded in probable cause—but not on Tuesdays. And unlawfully seized evidence 
must be excluded whenever five votes say so. 
Id. 
 2. See Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1565 (1999) (“Perhaps the most well-
known criminal windfall is the exclusionary rule. Under the modern interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment, courts must exclude evidence obtained by an illegal search or seizure, regardless of 
how probative it may be of the defendant’s guilt” (footnote omitted)); NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A STUDY IN CALIFORNIA 2 (1982) 
[hereinafter NIJ STUDY] (stating that 32.5% of all felony drug arrests cleared for prosecution in 1981 
to the Los Angeles County Prosecutor’s Office were denied after an initial review because of 
violations to search and seizure requirements, and that about 46% of individuals freed in California 
in 1976 and 1977 as a result of the exclusionary rule went on to commit additional crimes within 24 
months of their release); see also Harry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary 
Rule: Heeding Justice Blackmun’s Call To Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial 
Understanding About Its Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 45, 50–51 (1994) 
(noting that defendants often use the exclusionary rule to make unmerited suppression motions that 
can wear down prosecutors and can even prove to be successful and that thus, defendants are 
encouraged to make these motions because the slight cost is minimal in comparison to the potential 
windfall if the motion proves to be successful). 
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probative and often compelling incriminatory evidence,3 and its wide 
variance from the goals that gave rise to its creation,4 the rule is now in 
its forty-fifth year.5 Even the United States Supreme Court has beaten 
and battered6 the rule out of frustration at its draconian and odious 
remedy. And yet, we still only talk about it. Associate Supreme Court 
Justice Harry Blackmun talked about the rule in his 1984 concurring 
opinion in United States v. Leon: 
If a single principle may be drawn from this Court’s exclusionary rule 
decisions, from Weeks through Mapp v. Ohio, to the decisions handed 
down here today, it is that the scope of the exclusionary rule is subject 
to change in light of changing judicial understanding about the effects 
of the rule outside the confines of the courtroom.7
Like the weather—everybody talks about it, but nobody does anything. 
The great irony of the American justice system is that we cling to a rule 
that we are at best uncertain of and pay a tremendous cost for the 
privilege.8 Small wonder all the talk. 
Justice Blackmun prognosticated that the rule is “subject to change 
in light of changing judicial understanding about the effects of the rule 
outside the confines of the courtroom.”9 Has our understanding of the 
rule’s effects therefore changed? Do we know more now than we did in 
1961?10 Do we know more now than when Blackmun set forth his 
 3. See NIJ STUDY, supra note 2, at 10, 13. The study suggests that 4.8% of felony arrests 
were denied due to violations of search and seizure requirements. Limiting such prosecutions can 
preserve scarce financial resources, but suspected criminals are still freed without being charged or 
even tried for any offense; thus, the defendant benefits from the exclusionary rule before it is even 
applied to any evidence. Id. 
 4. See infra note 12. 
 5. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to criminal cases in 
state courts). 
 6. See infra Part II.B. 
 7. 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 8. See Christopher Slobogin, Reform: The Police: Testilying: Police Perjury and What To 
Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1037–60 (1996) (noting that police perjury in order to 
convict the guilty and avoid the consequences of the exclusionary rule has become so common that it 
has been named “testilying”). Id. at 1040. Prosecutors and judges often ignore such perjury because 
“they probably agree with the police that the end justifies the means.” Id. at 1047. In addition, one 
proposal to correct testilying includes eliminating the exclusionary rule. Id. at 1057. See also supra 
notes 2–3 and accompanying text for additional costs of the rule. 
 9. Leon, 468 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 10. See infra Part II.C; see also Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659. The Mapp Court argued that it cannot 
“lightly be assumed that, as a practical matter, adoption of the exclusionary rule fetters law 
enforcement.” Id. Although the exclusionary rule does restrain law enforcement, the rule, despite its 
numerous exceptions, is still far too draconian, often allowing probative evidence to be thrown to the 
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remarks in 1984?11 Do we have a better grasp as to whether the rule 
fulfills the very goals for which it was created, most significantly, the 
goal of deterring violation of Fourth Amendment rights?12
We certainly know more now than we used to know. The empirical 
research has given us a clearer notion about “the effects of the rule 
outside the confines of the courtroom.”13 And as shall be set forth later 
in this Article, we have come to learn that the rule does not accomplish 
what it was meant to accomplish because police officers are generally 
not deterred by its operation.14 If, then, our “understanding” has 
wayside. Furthermore, as more exceptions are continually being created, the initial perception of the 
rule’s “unfettering” effect has become dated. Id. 
 11. See L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule: 
A New and Extensive Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and a Call for Civil Administrative 
Remedy To Partially Replace the Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 678 (1998). Since the decision in 
Leon, a number of studies concerning the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule have been 
conducted, including the following: William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the 
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 311 (1991); Perrin et al., supra; Craig D. Uchida & Timothy S. Bynum, Search 
Warrants, Motions To Suppress and “Lost Cases”: The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule in Seven 
Jurisdictions, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1034 (1991); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The 
Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1016 (1987). Some studies have praised the exclusionary rule while others have damned it. 
But, all of the empirical studies have added further perspective to the exclusionary rule in an effort to 
answer whether the rule deters illegal police misconduct. See infra Part II.C. 
 12. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905. The Court in Leon argued that 
[i]f the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then 
evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law 
enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the 
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 919 (quoting U.S. v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see 
also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 260–61 (1983) (White, J., concurring); United States v. Janis, 
428 U.S. 433, 459 (1976); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, at 610–11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring 
in part). The Leon Court further contended that 
where the officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable, ‘excluding the evidence will not 
further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully 
apparent that . . . the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in 
similar circumstances. Excluding the evidence can in no way affect his future conduct 
unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 919–20 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539–40 (1976) (White, J., 
dissenting)). 
 13. Leon, 468 U.S. at 928; see infra Part II.C. 
 14. See infra note 148 and accompanying text (stating that police officers occasionally lie in 
suppression hearings to avoid exclusion); see infra notes 154–78 and accompanying text for a 
summary of two studies that found that police are generally not deterred by the exclusionary rule. 
William Heffernan and Richard Lovely’s study found that fifteen percent of 500 surveyed law 
enforcement officers would still follow an illegal course of conduct in violation of Fourth 
Amendment rights despite being aware of the exclusionary rule. Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 721. 
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changed, and we are underwhelmed with the exclusionary rule, is it not 
time to heed Justice Blackmun’s call and do something about it? 
Most of those engaged in thoughtful reflection about the efficacy of 
the exclusionary rule would agree that the rule is far from the effective 
remedy first envisioned by the Warren Court in the early sixties.15 And 
there certainly has been no lack of alternatives bandied about in the 
literature.16 Why then does it still remain the primary vehicle for 
enforcing the Fourth Amendment?17 If the devil we know isn’t working, 
aren’t we bound to try something else, especially when the devil at play 
comes with such tremendous costs?18
This Article is not meant to be just another academic alternative to 
the exclusionary rule that would quickly be relegated to the junkyard of 
such proposals, but is meant to be a guideline for actually moving past 
the rule.19 This Essay argues that such movement is justified and that the 
state courts are the places to effectuate the change. It goes on to provide 
a blueprint for enabling one trial judge in one county in one state court to 
institute change and nudge a nation beyond the exclusionary rule. 
The 1998 Perrin, Caldwell, and Chase study found that eighteen percent of 1144 law enforcement 
officers felt that suppression of evidence was either a minor concern or no concern at all. Id. 
 15. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (“[W]e can no longer permit [the Fourth Amendment] right to 
remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other 
basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the 
whim of any police officer, who in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its 
enjoyment.”); see also infra Part II.A (explaining the origins and development of the exclusionary 
rule). 
 16. See Caldwell & Chase, supra note 2, at 56–66 (noting that there can be an international 
perspective in looking at alternatives to the exclusionary rule because the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand have all taken different approaches in dealing with evidence obtained in 
violation of individual rights to privacy); Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 718, 736–43 (listing existing 
remedies to the rule as the good faith modification, tort actions, and civil rights, and other proposed 
remedies as an extension of the good faith exception and the Canadian tort remedy). Some 
additionally suggested alternatives to the rule include “criminal prosecution of the offending officer, 
internal discipline of the officer (including termination of employment and steps less than 
termination), payment of monetary damages by the officer after a lawsuit, or alternatively, after an 
administrative proceeding, and requiring the officer to participate in educational courses.” Id. at 718. 
 17. Although the Court has repeatedly limited the exclusionary rule’s application, it has kept 
the rule so that the Fourth Amendment’s protections do not remain an “empty promise.” Mapp, 367 
U.S. at 660. In refusing to abolish the exclusionary rule, the Court has made it clear that the rule’s 
primary purpose is to deter and that the rule should only be applied when it will achieve its 
deterrence goals. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 919; Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442–43 (1984); Elkins 
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). 
 18. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. 
 19. See supra note 16. 
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In this Article, I will track a hypothetical criminal case from illegal 
search and seizure through pretrial motions in which a trial prosecutor 
concedes that the fruits of the crime (a methamphetamine lab) were 
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The hypothetical 
prosecutor maintains that exclusion of the evidence would be 
inappropriate both because it would prevent probative evidence from 
trial and because it would not further the deterrence goal of the 
exclusionary rule. The prosecutor then asserts that since the officer 
involved was already sanctioned and reeducated on the requirements of 
search and seizure, he will be less likely to err in the future, thus 
accomplishing the goal of the exclusionary rule in deterring the officer 
from future violations and negating the need to exclude the fruits of the 
illegal search.20
The bulk of this Article will involve two exchanges. The first 
exchange involves the prosecutor, defense counsel, and trial judge at a 
pretrial suppression hearing during which the prosecutor succeeds in 
convincing the court that the exclusion of the evidence is not warranted 
in light of the remedial action that has already been taken. The second 
exchange occurs before an appellate court considering the writ taken by 
defense counsel following the trial court’s innovative and bold action in 
refusing to exclude evidence of the methamphetamine lab despite the 
Fourth Amendment violation. The exchange between the advocates and 
the three judge appellate panel will explore the policy of the rule, the 
effects of the rule outside the courtroom, and the appropriateness of one 
trial judge in one county in one state court refusing exclusion of the 
probative and incriminating evidence because of police error. 
Before exploring how movement beyond the exclusionary rule can 
be effectuated, however, it is necessary to show that such movement is 
justified. Part II of this Article, therefore, examines the genesis of and 
policy behind the exclusionary rule, the major limitations and exceptions 
that have been developed to avoid the rule’s distasteful effects, and the 
studies and data that have been accumulated concerning the rule’s 
success, or lack thereof, in reaching its policy goals. This Part 
demonstrates that the rule is not effective and change is justified. Part III 
 20. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (“The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily 
assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has 
deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such 
conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future 
counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused.” (quoting United States v. 
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975))); see also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974). 
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discusses the propriety of using the state courts as laboratories for change 
and experimentation within the framework of the federal system. Part IV 
sets forth the hypothetical and follows the hypothetical trial prosecutor 
through her attempts to cast the first pebble in the brook that leads to a 
new course of Fourth Amendment protection. Part V concludes that 
movement beyond the exclusionary rule is not only justified but also 
possible, and that the state courts are the proper venue in which to make 
the change. 
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR MOVING BEYOND 
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
Movement beyond the rule is justified by the exclusionary rule’s 
limited success in achieving its policy goal of deterring police officer 
violations of the Fourth Amendment as well as the distasteful effects of 
the rule that courts have tried to mitigate through various limitations and 
exceptions to the rule. This Part first examines the genesis of and policy 
behind the exclusionary rule through Weeks,21 Mapp,22 and their 
predecessors and progeny. It then examines the major limitations and 
exceptions that have been developed in order to avoid the rule’s 
distasteful effects. Finally, this Part summarizes the studies and the data 
that have accumulated over the past forty-five years, reflecting the 
success, or lack thereof, of the rule. 
A. Genesis and Policy of the Rule 
The contemporary understanding of the exclusionary rule, whereby 
probative evidence against a criminal defendant is excluded because of 
police error, did not suddenly emerge, fully developed. Instead, its 
origins can be traced back to a civil forfeiture case, Boyd v. United 
States, decided in 1886.23 Between this beginning and the Court’s 
articulation of the modern rule in its 1961 decision in Mapp v. Ohio,24 
the rule underwent many changes. 
 21. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 22. Mapp, 367 U.S. 643. 
 23. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Although Boyd does not seem to fit perfectly into the exclusionary 
rule’s history, it has been named as the beginning of the Court’s move toward an exclusionary rule. 
See Robert L. Misner, In Partial Praise of Boyd: The Grand Jury as a Catalyst for Fourth 
Amendment Change, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 811–12 (1997) (discussing how Boyd birthed the Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule). 
 24. 367 U.S. 643. 
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In Boyd the defendant was forced, pursuant to a government 
subpoena, to produce invoices that the prosecution intended to use 
against him.25 Boyd produced the invoices but objected to their use at 
trial, claiming that their introduction violated his Fifth Amendment 
protection against self-incrimination.26 The Supreme Court agreed and 
held that production of the invoices violated both the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments.27 The Court reasoned that 
[a] compulsory production of the private books and papers of the owner 
of goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit is compelling him to be a 
witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to 
the Constitution, and is the equivalent of a search and seizure—an 
unreasonable search and seizure—within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.28
Without discussion as to the policy served by exclusion, the Court 
held that admitting the invoices was improper.29 By so holding, the 
Court in Boyd planted the first seeds that would mature into the 
exclusionary rule we follow today; however, the path to Mapp was not 
without its twists and turns. 
In fact, in the 1904 case Adams v. New York,30 decided eighteen 
years after Boyd, the Supreme Court took a step back from the broad 
principles it had enunciated in Boyd. Adams, convicted of possessing 
gambling paraphernalia following an illegal police raid on his residence, 
claimed that since his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, the 
evidence gathered from the raid should be excluded.31 The Court, in 
what amounted to dicta, explained that it saw no connection between the 
Fourth Amendment violation and the exclusion of evidence and that “the 
courts do not stop to inquire as to the means by which the evidence was 
obtained.”32 Furthermore, the Court noted, 
 25. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 618. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 634–35, 638. 
 28. Id. at 634–35. 
 29. Id. at 638. In addition to holding that the invoices should not have been admitted, the 
Court also ruled that the entire action against the defendant was unconstitutional. Id. The Court 
relied heavily on the history of the Fourth Amendment and their belief that the Framers of the 
Amendment intended to restrain the government’s power to execute general warrants. Id. 
 30. 192 U.S. 585 (1904). 
 31. Id. at 594. 
 32. Id. 
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If the search warrant were illegal, or if the officer serving the warrant 
exceeded his authority, the party on whose complaint the warrant 
issued, or the officer, would be responsible for the wrong done; but this 
is no good reason for excluding the papers seized as evidence, if they 
were pertinent to the issue . . . .33
Thus, according to Adams, Fourth Amendment violations were the 
personal responsibility of the offending officer and no good purpose was 
served by exclusion of pertinent evidence, even that evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.34
Within a decade, however, the Court in Weeks v. United States 
initiated the exclusionary rule for use in the federal system.35 In 
excluding probative evidence, the Weeks Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment puts federal officials “in the exercise of their power and 
authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such 
power and authority.”36 The Court emphasized the need to “forever 
secure the people . . . against all unreasonable searches and seizures 
under the guise of law,”37 and reasoned that “[i]f letters and private 
documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a 
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment . . 
. is of no value.”38 Concerned with the taint on judicial integrity, the 
Court held that “[t]he tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of 
the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and 
enforced confessions . . . should find no sanction in the judgments of the 
courts which are charged at all times with the support of the 
Constitution.”39 Thus, in Weeks, judicial integrity emerged as the policy 
goal of evidence exclusion. 
Following Weeks, analysis of the exclusionary rule laid relatively 
dormant until 1949 when the Court decided Wolf v. Colorado.40 
Suspecting Wolf of performing illegal abortions, Colorado police 
searched his office without a warrant and obtained incriminating 
 33. Id. at 595. 
 34. Id. 
 35. 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
 36. Id. at 391–92. 
 37. Id. at 392. 
 38. Id. at 393. 
 39. Id. at 392. 
 40. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
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evidence.41 In Wolf, the Court took the long overdue step of 
incorporating the Fourth Amendment into the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and making it applicable to the states;42 
however, the heart of its opinion focused on whether the federal rule of 
evidence exclusion would be extended to state prosecutions.43 The 
Court, in refusing to extend the rule, voiced the following notion: 
[I]n practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of 
deterring unreasonable searches, [but] it is not for this Court to 
condemn as falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due 
Process Clause a State’s reliance upon other methods which, if 
consistently enforced, would be equally effective.44
The Court also reasoned that there were “reasons for excluding 
evidence unreasonably obtained by the federal police which are less 
compelling in the case of police under state or local authority.”45 
Specifically, “[t]he public opinion of a community can far more 
effectively be exerted against oppressive conduct on the part of police 
directly responsible to the community itself than can local opinion, 
sporadically aroused, be brought to bear upon remote authority 
pervasively exerted throughout the country.”46
Based on the Court’s commitment to the autonomy of the states,47 its 
reliance on the approaches of other jurisdictions,48 and the “less 
compelling reason” for excluding evidence in the case of state or local 
police,49 the Court felt no need to extend the exclusionary rule to the 
states.50 In fact, the Court even referred to the Weeks rule as one that 
 41. Wolf v. People, 187 P.2d 926, 927 (Colo. 1947), aff’d sub nom. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 
U.S. 25 (1949). 
 42. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27–28. 
 43. Id. at 25, 28–33. To decide this issue the Court focused much of its attention on whether 
the Due Process Clause forbade the introduction of illegally obtained evidence. After holding that it 
did not, the Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule to the states. Id. at 31–33. 
 44. Id. at 31. In support of its refusal to mandate the exclusionary rule to the states, the Court 
also examined ten jurisdictions in the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth of Nations 
and found that “none has held evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure inadmissible.” Id. at 
30. Moreover, the Court hesitated to treat the remedy of exclusion as an essential part of the Fourth 
Amendment rights. This hesitation came after the majority found that “most of the English-speaking 
world [did] not regard as vital to such protection the exclusion of evidence thus obtained.” Id. at 29. 
 45. Id. at 32. 
 46. Id. at 32–33. 
 47. Id. at 31–32. 
 48. Id. at 29–30. 
 49. Id. at 32. 
 50. Id. at 31–33. 
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“was not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment”51 but was created in Weeks through “judicial 
implication.”52 Particularly germane to this discussion is the fact that the 
Wolf decision clearly focused the debate about the propriety of evidence 
exclusion around the issue of exclusion as a means of deterring police 
misconduct.53
Incidents of local and state police misconduct, however, continued to 
reverberate across the nation and just three years following Wolf, the 
Court was confronted with a particularly egregious case of police 
misconduct in Rochin v. California.54 In Rochin, the police entered the 
suspect’s house without a warrant, forced themselves into his bedroom 
and, as he attempted to swallow capsules, struggled with him and then 
hustled him to a hospital to have his stomach pumped.55 The resulting 
evidence from the illegal search and seizure was admitted at trial despite 
Rochin’s objections.56
Although the Court in Rochin showed deference to the state’s power 
to define criminal conduct,57 the Court noted that when a state 
conviction “offend[s] those canons of decency and fairness”58 that are at 
the heart of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
state may not use the evidence at trial, and the defendant’s conviction 
may not stand.59 The Rochin Court felt “compelled to conclude that the 
proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than offend 
some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about 
combating crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the 
conscience.”60 While Rochin did not mandate exclusion under the Fourth 
Amendment, it cited the same policy concern from Weeks for permitting 
exclusion under the Fourteenth Amendment, namely that the integrity of 
the court should not be sullied with such ill begotten fruit.61
 51. Id. at 28. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. at 31 (recognizing for the first time that “the exclusion of evidence may be an 
effective way of deterring unreasonable searches”). 
 54. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
 55. Id. at 166. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 168–69. 
 58. Id. at 169 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416–17 (1945) (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
 59. Id. at 169, 173–74. 
 60. Id. at 172. 
 61. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). 
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Two years later in Irvine v. California, the Court affirmed a 
conviction despite its disgust with the conduct of the police.62 Unlike the 
circumstances in Rochin, the police conduct in Irvine “[did] not involve 
coercion, violence or brutality to the person, but rather a trespass to 
property, plus eavesdropping.”63 Irvine is significant in that it recentered 
the exclusionary rule dialogue on police deterrence.64 Writing for the 
Court, Justice Jackson noted that nearly two-thirds of the states refused 
to exclude illegally obtained evidence despite the Court’s adoption of a 
federal exclusionary rule some four decades earlier in Weeks.65 Justice 
Jackson surmised that this less-than-ringing endorsement for an 
exclusionary rule was because “[t]here is no reliable evidence known to 
us that inhabitants of those states which exclude the evidence suffer less 
from lawless searches and seizures than those of states that admit it.”66 
The Court acknowledged the perceived minimal deterrent effect of the 
exclusionary rule: 
That the rule of exclusion and reversal results in the escape of guilty 
persons is more capable of demonstration than that it deters invasions 
of right by the police. The case is made, so far as the police are 
concerned, when they announce that they have arrested their man. 
Rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing 
official, while it may, and likely will, release the wrong-doing 
defendant. It deprives society of its remedy against one lawbreaker 
because he has been pursued by another. It protects one against whom 
incriminating evidence is discovered, but does nothing to protect 
innocent persons who are the victims of illegal but fruitless searches. 
The disciplinary or educational effect of the court’s releasing the 
defendant for police misbehavior is so indirect as to be no more than a 
mild deterrent at best. Some discretion is still left to the states in 
criminal cases, for which they are largely responsible, and we think it is 
for them to determine which rule best serves them.67
 62. 347 U.S. 128, 132, 137–38 (1954). Although the Supreme Court affirmed Irvine’s 
conviction, it suggested that the Attorney General look into the case for potential violations of 
federal law by the police. Id. at 137–38. The Supreme Court also directed the Clerk of the Court to 
forward a copy of the record and the opinion to the Attorney General. Id. at 138. 
 63. Id. at 133. 
 64. See infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text for the Court’s discussion of whether the 
federal exclusionary rule was actually deterring unreasonable searches and seizures by the police. 
 65. Irvine, 347 U.S. at 135. 
 66. Id. at 136. 
 67. Id. at 136–37. 
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Despite Justice Jackson’s vehemence and distaste for the rule and the 
Court’s reluctance to extend the rule to the states, the sea change that 
would be Mapp v. Ohio was a mere seven years away.68
One year prior to Mapp, the Supreme Court, in Elkins v. United 
States, held “that evidence obtained by state officers during a search 
which, if conducted by federal officers, would have violated the 
defendant’s immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures under the 
Fourth Amendment is inadmissible . . . in a federal criminal trial.”69 This 
decision effectively put an end to the “silver platter” doctrine whereby 
state police officers would conduct the search and then hand the evidence 
over to the federal authorities for their use.70 However, it is the Court’s 
discussion of the policy goals of deterrence that merits particular 
attention here. Justice Stewart wrote that “[t]he [exclusionary] rule is 
calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter—to compel 
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available 
way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.”71 So it was that on the 
eve of Mapp v. Ohio, deterrence fully emerged as the rationale for the 
exclusionary rule. 
Finally, in Mapp v. Ohio,72 the Court applied the exclusionary rule 
to the states.73 The Court acknowledged, at least in part, that its past 
reluctance to impose the rule on the states was based largely on factual 
considerations.74 Given that concern, Mapp was the perfect vehicle for 
imposing the exclusionary rule on the states because the police conduct 
  68. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 69. 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960). 
 70. Id. at 208. See id. at 208 n.2 for cases discussing the silver platter doctrine. 
 71. Id. at 217. Despite Justice Stewart’s statement that the purpose of the exclusionary rule 
was to deter, he recognized that statistical evidence demonstrating the effectiveness, or lack thereof, 
of the rule was nearly impossible to come by. He stated, 
Empirical statistics are not available to show that the inhabitants of states which follow 
the exclusionary rule suffer less from lawless searches and seizures than do those of 
states which admit evidence unlawfully obtained. Since as a practical matter it is never 
easy to prove a negative, it is hardly likely that conclusive factual data could ever be 
assembled. For much the same reason, it cannot positively be demonstrated that 
enforcement of the criminal law is either more or less effective under either rule. 
Id. at 218. 
 72. 367 U.S. 643. 
 73. Id. at 655. 
 74. Id. at 650–53. The Mapp Court did not specify exactly what “factual considerations” it 
was concerned with in previous cases where it refused to adopt the exclusionary rule for use in the 
states. However, given the Court’s past hesitance to adopt the rule, it can be inferred that the facts in 
previous cases were not as egregious as those in Mapp and, therefore, the Court did not feel 
compelled to take strong action as they did in Mapp. 
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in the case was particularly awful.75 The police, without the authority of 
a warrant, raided Dollree Mapp’s home, fought with her after she asked 
to see a warrant and then forcibly dragged her around the home while 
they conducted a thorough search.76 The officers behavior was 
sufficiently shocking to compel the Court to “close the only courtroom 
door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in 
flagrant abuse of [the right to privacy], reserved to all persons.”77
In Mapp, the Court took the final step in a seventy-five year line of 
cases dealing with the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, and, 
after recognizing the “obvious futility of relegating the Fourth 
Amendment to the protection of other remedies,”78 the Court removed 
the inconsistency between state and federal courts and created a rule that 
excluded illegally obtained evidence from all criminal trials.79 The Court 
was rightfully concerned that without safeguards such as the 
exclusionary rule, the Fourth Amendment “might as well be stricken 
from the Constitution”80 because it would be reduced to a “form of 
words.”81 The Court believed that deciding Mapp any other way would 
protect a citizen’s right against invasion of privacy “but . . . withhold its 
privilege and enjoyment.”82 Justice Clark, writing for the Court, stated 
that “the purpose of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter—to compel respect 
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by 
removing the incentive to disregard it.’”83
Although Justice Clark reiterated the Court’s deterrence rationale 
from Elkins 84 and made brief mention to the preservation of judicial 
 75. The police went to Dollree Mapp’s home to investigate a tip regarding a recent bombing 
and some information that a large amount of obscene materials was being kept in the home. After the 
police arrived at Mapp’s home, she refused to let them in without a warrant. A few hours later, after 
keeping the home under surveillance, several police officers forced down Mapp’s door and stormed 
into her home. They waved a piece of paper, claiming that it was a warrant and refused to allow 
Mapp’s attorney, who had arrived on the scene, into the house. As if the police had not done enough 
to violate Mapp’s rights, they continued by struggling with her after she grabbed the “warrant” and 
stuck it in her bosom. Following the struggle, Mapp was handcuffed and dragged around the house 
while the police conducted a widespread search. Id. at 644–45. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 654–55. 
 78. Id. at 652. 
 79. Id. at 655. 
 80. Id. at 648 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914)). 
 81. Id. at 655. 
 82. Id. at 656. 
 83. Id. (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). 
 84. See id. 
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integrity as an additional rationale,85 he included no extensive discussion 
of the policy goals for the exclusionary rule. Given the watershed 
significance of Mapp, it is curious that the opinion neither extensively 
detailed the deterrence benefits that would flow from the rule nor cited 
any authority showing that exclusion would accomplish these goals.86 It 
is clear, however, that in Mapp the Court enforced the Fourth 
Amendment’s right of privacy against the states “by the same sanction of 
exclusion as is used against the Federal Government.”87
The decisions from Boyd to Mapp demonstrate the Court’s gradual 
shift from refusing to take notice of the process through which relevant 
evidence came to the notice of the authorities,88 to creating an 
exclusionary rule within the federal system,89 to incorporating the Fourth 
Amendment into the Due Process Clause and making it applicable to the 
states,90 and finally to imposing the exclusionary rule on the states.91 
The most controversial rule in criminal procedure thus emerged through 
eight cases decided over a seventy-five year span. 
In the wake of Mapp, the question remains whether exclusion 
actually does deter police misconduct. Perhaps it was a testament to the 
Court’s uncertainty in opting for evidence exclusion that in Mapp it did 
not preclude other methods of deterring police misconduct.92 That door 
has never been closed. 
 85. See id. At the end of its opinion the Court stated that its decision gives “to the courts[] 
that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.” Id. at 660. Given the Court’s 
obvious concern with deliberate violations of constitutional rights and its recognition that something 
needed to be in place in order to protect those rights, one hardly can consider this brief mentioning 
of judicial integrity the primary reason for the imposition of the exclusionary rule on the states. 
 86. Instead of citing to authority for its decision, the Court focused on establishing a rule that 
would enforce the Fourth Amendment’s protections. See id. at 660 (“[W]e can no longer permit [the 
Fourth Amendment] right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner 
and to like effect as other basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it 
to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, 
chooses to suspend its enjoyment.”). 
 87. Id. at 655. 
 88. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 594–95 (1904). 
 89. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
 90. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949). 
 91. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. 
 92. In his concurring opinion in Mapp, Justice Black stated that he agreed with the “plain 
implication of the Court’s opinion that the federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth 
Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate.” Id. at 661 
(Black, J., concurring) (citing Wolf, 338 U.S. at 39–40). Furthermore, in United States v. Calandra, 
the Court held that “the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally 
seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As with any remedial device, the 
application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought 
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B. Limitations and Exceptions 
Given the harsh social consequences of a rule that disallows relevant 
evidence of crime, the post-Mapp retreat into the hills and valleys of 
exceptions and limitations comes as no surprise. The retreat has led the 
Court to bend and twist the application of the exclusionary rule itself, as 
well as the laws of search and seizure, in an attempt to avoid the odious 
consequences of exclusion. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to 
detail every exception, if indeed that is even possible, the most 
significant limitations are briefly set forth in this Section. 
Foreshadowing the fits and starts that would come to be the hallmark 
of the American rules of search and seizure, the Supreme Court, less than 
two years after Mapp, acknowledged a limit to the application of the 
exclusionary rule when “the connection between the [illegal] arrest and 
the [resulting evidence] had ‘become so attenuated as to dissipate the 
taint.’”93 In Wong Sun, a case in which the illegal arrest of one man led 
to evidence used to convict another person, the Court relied on a rule set 
forth in Nardone v. United States,94 decided twenty-two years before 
Mapp, holding that the evidence was properly admitted because 
sufficient intervening circumstances had broken the causal chain between 
the initial illegal arrest and resulting evidence.95 In setting forth the 
standard to be applied, the Court held that evidence was not 
automatically considered 
“fruit of the poisonous tree” simply because it would not have 
come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the 
more apt question in such a case is “whether, granting 
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which 
instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of 
most efficaciously served.” 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). See also Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 
524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (stating that “because the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally 
mandated, we have held it to be applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its 
‘substantial social costs’” (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984))). 
 93. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (citing Nardone v. United States, 
308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)). 
 94. 308 U.S. at 341. 
 95. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 473–75, 491; see id. at 484–85 for the Court’s discussion of 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920), where the Court held that 
illegally obtained facts may be used if “knowledge of them is gained from an independent source.” 
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that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to 
be purged of the primary taint.”96
Thus, Wong Sun became the first case to recognize a limitation in the 
post-Mapp world, which limitation served to blunt the impact of the 
exclusionary rule. 
After the attenuation exception in Wong Sun97 came the grand jury 
limitation of United States v. Calandra.98 In this 1974 decision, the 
Court held that a grand jury witness could not refuse to answer questions 
even though the questions were generated by illegally obtained 
evidence.99 In Calandra, the Court once again acknowledged that “the 
[exclusionary] rule’s prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police 
conduct,”100 but that the deterrent effect in this situation would be 
“uncertain at best.”101 This limitation is especially significant since it is 
based on a failure of the rule to achieve its primary purpose—deterrence. 
Once again police illegality and once again no evidence exclusion. The 
Calandra Court was indeed uncertain of the deterrent impact of 
excluding such evidence.102
Four years later, in Rakas v. Illinois, the Court implemented its 
broadest limitation of the exclusionary rule in holding that “a mere 
passenger . . . lacks standing to challenge the legality of the search of [a] 
vehicle.”103 In limiting the class of persons that could assert the 
exclusionary rule, the Court noted that Fourth Amendment rights are 
personal104 and that “[c]onferring standing to raise vicarious Fourth 
Amendment claims would necessarily mean a more widespread 
 96. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (internal citations omitted) (relying on Nardone, 308 U.S. at 
338, 341 (1939)). 
 97. Id. 
 98. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
 99. Id. at 342, 354–55. 
 100. Id. at 347. The Court also quoted from the majority opinion in Elkins v. United States, 
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960), which held that “[t]he rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its 
purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively 
available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.” 
 101. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351. The Court further noted that “[w]hatever deterrence of police 
misconduct may result from the exclusion of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it is 
unrealistic to assume that application of the rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly 
further that goal.” Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. 439 U.S. 128, 131 (1978) (refusing to recognize that passengers of a car have standing to 
object to an illegal search of the car). 
 104. Id. at 133 (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)). 
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invocation of the exclusionary rule.”105 In addition to limiting the rule’s 
“widespread invocation,” the Rakas decision provided the clearest 
evidence of the Court’s dissatisfaction with the marginal, even 
questionable, benefits of deterring police action measured against the 
substantial cost to the public of excluding incriminating evidence.106 If 
exclusion is the best means of achieving deterrence, why not a blanket 
exclusion of all illegally seized evidence, regardless of who raises the 
claim? 
Less than two years after the Rakas limitation, the Court in United 
States v. Havens further restricted application of the exclusionary rule by 
holding that illegally obtained evidence could be used to impeach a 
defendant’s testimony even though it could not be used in the 
prosecution’s case in chief.107 The Court held that in the impeachment of 
testimony, the interest in the integrity of the fact-finding process was 
outweighed by the interest in having false testimony refuted.108 Writing 
for the Court, Justice White emphasized “the importance of arriving at 
the truth in criminal trials.”109 This language is ironic considering that 
highly probative and incriminating evidence is often precluded from 
these same criminal trials under the exclusionary rule. 
The 1984 term produced two decisions that further contracted the 
breadth and scope of the rule. First, in Nix v. Williams, the defendant’s 
statements, taken in violation of the Sixth Amendment, led the police to 
the body of a girl he had murdered.110 However, during the suppression 
hearing, it was determined that the police, without the aid of the illegally 
obtained statements, would have found the body within a short time.111 
The Court refused to suppress the body as evidence, reasoning that “[i]f 
the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by 
lawful means . . . then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the 
evidence should be received. Anything less would reject logic, 
 105. Id. at 137. 
 106. Id. The Court was “not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the 
exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in 
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the 
evidence which exposes the truth.” Id. (quoting Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174–75). 
 107. 446 U.S. 620, 627–28 (1980). 
 108. Id. at 627. 
 109. Id. at 626. 
 110. 467 U.S. 431, 434–40 (1984). 
 111. Id. at 437–38. 
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experience, and common sense.”112 Again, the Court demonstrated it 
was willing to limit the exclusionary rule when it was shown that the 
policy behind the rule was not met. 
Less than a month later, the Court in United States v. Leon again 
refused to exclude illegal evidence, which in this case had been seized 
pursuant to a warrant that was later found to lack probable cause.113 The 
Court recognized that officers cannot be deterred when they have already 
acted as a reasonable officer should act in the same situation.114 Because 
of the officer’s reasonable good faith belief that the warrant was 
adequately supported, “the extreme sanction of exclusion [was] 
inappropriate.”115 The Court further acknowledged that evidence should 
be suppressed only “in those unusual cases in which exclusion will 
further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.”116 Such language would 
seem to require an examination of every instance of police illegality to 
assess the appropriateness of applying the exclusionary rule, implying 
that when the goal of deterrence is not served, exclusion is not required. 
Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Leon is particularly significant. 
He characterized Leon as “another chapter in the volume of Fourth 
Amendment law”117 and insisted that the Court must evaluate its past 
decisions with a discerning eye and consider its future decisions as an 
opportunity for change. He wrote, “What must be stressed, however, is 
that any empirical judgment about the effect of the exclusionary rule in a 
particular class of cases necessarily is a provisional one. By their very 
nature, the assumptions on which we proceed today cannot be cast in 
stone.”118
 112. Id. at 444. 
 113. 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984). 
 114. Id. at 919 (noting that when an officer has acted in complete good faith, “the deterrence 
rationale loses much of its force” (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975))). 
Furthermore, the Court went on to say that 
[i]f the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then 
evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law 
enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the 
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 926 (quoting Peltier, 422 U.S. at 542). 
 115. Id. at 926. 
 116. Id. at 918. 
 117. Id. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 118. Id. at 928. 
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Following the 1984 cases of Nix and Leon, the retreat from Mapp lay 
relatively dormant119 until 1998, when the Court held in Pennsylvania 
Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott that parole boards were not 
required to exclude illegally obtained evidence in parole revocation 
hearings.120 The Court, as it had done in Calandra, Nix, and Leon,121 
recognized the substantial costs imposed on society by the exclusionary 
rule and, consequently, reeled in its scope. The decision thereby allowed 
illegally obtained evidence to be admissible at parole revocation hearings 
on the basis that “the marginal deterrence benefits . . . would be minimal 
because the use of the exclusionary rule in criminal trials already deter[s] 
illegal searches.”122
The latest chapter in the Supreme Court’s contraction of the 
exclusionary rule is United States v. Patane, decided in 2004.123 As a 
result of a Fifth Amendment violation, the police were led to a gun used 
by the defendant.124 In ruling that the gun could be allowed into 
evidence, the Court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment’s protections 
against self-incrimination were “not implicated by the admission into 
evidence of the physical fruit of a voluntary statement.”125 The Court 
 119. Although the Court may not have established any “landmark” exceptions or limitations 
between 1984 and 1998, they did adopt some smaller, less known exceptions to the rule. See, e.g., 
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (holding that the exclusionary rule should not apply when an 
officer reasonably relies on a statute that is later deemed unconstitutional); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 
468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule would not apply to civil deportation 
proceedings). 
 120. 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998). 
 121. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (recognizing that “the 
application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought 
most efficaciously served”). The Court in Calandra further noted that “[a]ny incremental deterrent 
effect which might be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best.” 
Id. at 351. See also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (holding that “if the prosecution can 
establish . . . that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful 
means . . . then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received”); 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 913 (noting that the Court’s “evaluation of the costs and benefits of suppressing 
reliable physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached 
and neutral magistrate leads to the conclusion that such evidence should be admissible”). The Leon 
Court also concluded that “the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence 
obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot 
justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” Id. at 922. 
 122. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 524 U.S. at 363. The Court’s decision also seemed to partially 
rest on its unwillingness to interfere with the traditional administration procedure of parole 
revocation hearings because “[t]he State . . . has an ‘overwhelming interest’ in ensuring that a 
parolee complies with [parole] requirements.” Id. at 365. 
 123. 542 U.S. 630 (2004). 
 124. Id. at 635. 
 125. Id. at 637. 
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saw no reason to require the exclusion of the physical evidence resulting 
from an unwarned statement because “unlike unreasonable searches . . . 
with respect to mere failures to warn, [there is] nothing to deter.”126
These cases clearly demonstrate that rather than extending the 
exclusionary rule’s protections in the forty-five years since its Mapp 
decision, the Court has consistently reined in the rule. It has done so 
because the costs incurred by the public often do not outweigh the 
deterrence “benefit” that may result. However, despite the Court’s 
pullback, the rule continues to operate in a vast number of situations.  
C. Studies and Data as to the Efficacy of the Rule 
Is there really a deterrence “benefit” tradeoff? As of the writing of 
this Article, fifteen studies of various kinds have been conducted 
attempting to answer that very question.127 Some of the studies involved 
surveys of police officers;128 others surveyed persons other than police 
officers involved in the criminal justice system;129 some analyzed 
statistics regarding arrests, convictions, and suppression motions;130 and 
one study even attempted the direct observation of police officers in the 
field.131 Of the fifteen studies, three have attempted to ascertain directly 
from police officers whether the exclusionary rule deters them from 
engaging in searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment: 
the 1987 Orfield Study,132 the 1991 Heffernan and Lovely Study,133 and 
 126. Id. at 642. The Court also relied on the fact that the Fifth Amendment already contained 
its own exclusionary rule because of its provision that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” Id. at 640 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V). Based on 
this reasoning, the Court did not see any reason to extend the exclusionary rule’s reach to the Fifth 
Amendment. 
 127. See supra note 11; infra notes 132–36, 183–85. 
 128. See infra notes 137–78 and accompanying text for a summary of the three studies that 
have attempted to understand the rule’s effectiveness by questioning police officers. 
 129. See Michael Katz, The Supreme Court and the States: An Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio in 
North Carolina. The Model, the Study, and the Implications, 45 N.C. L. REV. 119 (1966), Stuart S. 
Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 283, and 
Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the 
Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75 (1992), for the studies that have questioned others 
involved in the criminal justice system. 
 130. See infra note 136 for the eight studies that have examined the rule through the use of 
statistics rather than by questioning police officers or others involved in the criminal justice system. 
 131. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966). In this unique study, Jerome 
Skolnick has attempted to gauge the rule’s effectiveness by undertaking direct observation of police 
officers in the field. 
 132. Orfield, supra note 11. 
 133. Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 11. 
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the 1998 Perrin, Caldwell, and Chase Study.134 I have focused this 
inquiry on these latter three studies as they have attempted to gauge the 
“cognitive component of deterrence,”135 specifically police officer 
motivation to avoid illegal searches and seizures. While the remaining 
studies that engage in statistical analysis and surveys certainly provide 
helpful data, they do not probe officer motivation to abide by the 
rules,136 which is the overarching question of the deterrence rationale for 
the exclusionary rule. 
1. The Orfield study 
In conducting his study, Myron Orfield interviewed twenty-six 
police officers deployed in the Narcotics Section of the Chicago Police 
Department.137 His findings are fascinating in that all of the officers he 
interviewed said they approved of the exclusionary rule, but when 
Orfield pushed them as to specifics concerning their approval, their 
responses generally belied their initial assessment.138 For instance, more 
than half said the rule “frequently,” “reasonably often,” or “very 
frequently” kept them from making a search they thought they should 
 134. Perrin et al., supra note 11. 
 135. Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 11, at 321. 
 136. There have been numerous studies that attempt to understand the exclusionary rule’s 
effects without questioning officers. For example, in 1963 Professor Stuart Nagel sent out 250 
questionnaires to prosecuting attorneys, judges, police chiefs, defense attorneys, and ACLU officials 
in order to gain an understanding of the effects that the exclusionary rule was having. Nagel, supra 
note 129, at 283–84. Three years later, in 1966, Michael Katz attempted to study the rule by sending 
out over two hundred questionnaires to police chiefs, sheriffs, prosecuting attorneys, defense 
attorneys, and trial judges in North Carolina. Katz, supra note 129, at 131. More recently, in 1992 
Myron Orfield conducted a study by interviewing public defenders, judges, states attorneys, and 
other prosecutors in Cook County, Chicago. Orfield, supra note 129, at 85–88. Eight studies have 
been conducted by analyzing arrest statistics, conviction statistics, return of seized property, and 
suppression motions. See NIJ STUDY, supra note 2, at 2; COMPTROLLER GEN., U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS, GGD-79-45 (1979); Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-
Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 87 (1968) [hereinafter Effect of 
Mapp v. Ohio]; Bradley C. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and 
a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681 (1973); Bradley C. Canon, Testing the 
Effectiveness of Civil Liberties Policies at the State and Federal Levels, 5 AM. POL. Q. 57 (1977); 
Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 715 
(1970); James E. Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its 
Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973); Uchida & Bynum, supra note 11. Finally, there has been 
one study that attempted direct observation of police officers in the field. See SKOLNICK, supra note 
131, at 33–35. 
 137. Orfield, supra note 11, at 1024–25. 
 138. Id. at 1053. 
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make.139 Further, fifty percent of the officers said the rule did a 
“moderate amount” of harm to police work.140 Faint praise indeed. This 
seeming contradiction between approval of the rule and the rule’s 
negative effects on police work is best understood in a comparative 
sense: to the officers, the exclusionary rule is preferable to a system that 
would permit victims of illegal searches to sue them.141 The officers 
overwhelmingly believed that such a direct sanction would have a 
chilling effect on how they went about their jobs.142 A greater chilling 
effect than the exclusionary rule even? Consequently, even though the 
rule often kept them from doing their job and resulted in harm to police 
work, it was preferable to the direct sanctions that would otherwise be 
imposed against them.143
Orfield, noting that the deterrence goal of the rule can occur only if 
the offending officers learn from their mistakes, also questioned the 
officers on whether the existence of the rule improves police knowledge 
of the rules of search and seizure.144 Orfield found that eighty-five 
percent of the twenty-six responding officers said they were always 
informed when the evidence they seized had been suppressed and that 
they generally understood the basis for the suppressions.145 While these 
findings, at first blush, would seem to support the deterrence rationale, 
they must be put in context. All of the twenty-six responding officers 
worked in the Narcotics Section and were aware of that section’s policy 
of demotion or transfer upon a second suppression.146 It may well be that 
the threat of the more direct sanction pushed this small group of officers 
to better learn and comply with the intricacies of the Fourth Amendment. 
Orfield’s study also addressed some of the costs of the exclusionary 
rule, specifically police perjury at suppression hearings. His interviews 
disclosed that almost all the officers admitted that police occasionally 
lie.147 He found that approximately half of the responding officers stated 
 139. Id. at 1052–53. 
 140. Id. at 1053. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1053–54. Nearly ninety-five percent of the officers surveyed believed a chilling 
effect would result if victims were allowed to sue the offending officer. 
 143. Id. at 1053. 
 144. Id. at 1033–34. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id at 1044–46. 
 147. Id. at 1049–50. According to his results, Orfield found that nineteen out of the twenty-
two surveyed officers reported that occurrences in which a judge did not believe a police officer was 
“unusual, but not rare.” Id. at 1049. Additionally, two of the responding officers reported that judges 
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that judges were “frequently correct” in disbelieving police testimony.148 
Perhaps even more alarming was that seventy-six percent stated that the 
police often “shade the facts” to establish probable cause.149
From his mixed findings, Orfield surprisingly concluded that the rule 
does serve its deterrence goals.150 He believed his findings supported the 
view that the police are knowledgeable in Fourth Amendment law, that 
they learn from their mistakes, and that they are positioned to comport 
their conduct to the law in the future.151
Several concerns arise in assessing the value of Orfield’s study in 
determining the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule. First, his 
conclusions are undermined by the scant number of officers involved. In 
addition, he surveyed narcotics officers who, because of their regular 
exposure to suppression motions, were more conversant in Fourth 
Amendment law than most other police officers.152 Further, his findings 
that officers unanimously approve of the exclusionary rule153 were 
largely contradicted in his more focused follow-up inquiries and, in large 
part, may well be a function of the fear of more direct sanctions such as 
job terminations, job suspensions, or fines against offending police 
officers. 
2. The Heffernan and Lovely study 
The second significant study involving the direct questioning of the 
police was conducted in 1991 by Professors William Heffernan and 
Richard Lovely.154 Heffernan and Lovely attempted to gauge the level of 
police understanding of search and seizure law, believing that police 
ignorance of the subject would undermine the deterrent effect of the 
“commonly” disbelieve police testimony, while one officer reported that judges “never” disbelieve 
police testimony. Id. Of the responding officers, forty-eight percent stated that judges were 
“frequently correct” in disbelieving police testimony. Id. at 1049–50. Perhaps most alarming was 
that seventy-six percent of the responding officers stated that the police often “shade the facts” to 
establish probable cause. Id. at 1050. 
 148. See Caldwell & Chase, supra note 2, at 52–53 (arguing that because of the exclusionary 
rule’s effect, “officers have an incentive to commit perjury or . . . to carefully tailor the description 
of their investigative activities”). Thus, rather than deterring police misconduct as the rule was 
intended, it has motivated “officers to commit other illegal acts.” Id. at 53. 
 149. Orfield, supra note 11, at 1050. 
 150. Id. at 1054. 
 151. Id. at 1033–34, 1036. 
 152. Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 681. 
 153. Orfield, supra note 11, at 1051. 
 154. Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 11. 
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exclusionary rule.155 Utilizing a far larger number of respondents than in 
Orfield’s 1987 study, the authors administered a series of hypotheticals 
based on recent Supreme Court rulings involving warrantless police 
intrusion.156 The authors also gave the same questions to groups of 
prosecutors and public defenders as well as college students enrolled in 
an introductory criminal justice course.157 Predictably, of the three 
groups, the lawyers demonstrated the most thorough knowledge of 
search and seizure law (73.3%), the police followed (56.7%), and the 
college students brought up the rear (48%).158 In addition to concluding 
that slightly more than half of police officers were knowledgeable with 
recent search and seizure decisions, the study showed that an alarming 
34% of police officers believed it was legal to make a warrantless search 
when actual circumstances would render the action unconstitutional.159 
Even though Heffernan and Lovely concluded that the indirect sanction 
of evidence exclusion and perhaps lost prosecutions was sufficient to 
deter most officers from Fourth Amendment violations,160 the poor 
performance by the officers regarding Fourth Amendment law seems to 
undermine that conclusion. There can be no deterrence in the absence of 
police understanding the law. 
One other finding of this study merits attention. Heffernan and 
Lovely found that out of the more than 500 officers surveyed, 15% 
would intentionally follow an illegal course of conduct.161 Thus, nearly 
one in six would knowingly violate someone’s Fourth Amendment 
rights. Such a number is significant in itself, but when one realizes that it 
is almost assuredly understated, it raises serious concerns about the 
effectiveness of the indirect sanction of the exclusionary rule. 
3. The Perrin, Caldwell, and Chase study 
The third study of significance that attempts to ascertain directly 
from officers the deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule was conducted 
 155. Id. at 311, 355. 
 156. Id. at 326–27. Orfield surveyed only twenty-six officers in one department while 
Hefferman and Lovely surveyed 547 officers in several different departments. See id. at 331; 
Orfield, supra note 11, at 1024–25. 
 157. Hefferman & Lovely, supra note 11, at 331. 
 158. Id. at 332–33. 
 159. Id. at 346, 355. 
 160. Id. at 361. 
 161. Id. at 345–52. 
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by Professors Tim Perrin, Carol Chase, and me.162 In this study we sent 
out questionnaires to the 1144 law enforcement officers in Ventura 
County, California and received responses back from 411 of them. 
Additionally, we surveyed a group of officers from throughout California 
who had recently attended a continuing education seminar at which they 
received instruction on search and seizure law.163 We used this latter 
group for comparative purposes to test the value and effect of continuing 
education. Also for comparative purposes, we administered the same 
hypothetical questions concerning search and seizure law (part of the 
questionnaire) to eighty first-year law students who had just completed a 
criminal procedure class. The questionnaire consisted of three sections: 
information concerning biographical information (rank, experience, and 
education); search and seizure law; and police interrogation practices.164 
The second and third sections were designed to provide information 
concerning the “cognitive component of deterrence,” “specific deterrence 
of offending officers,” the costs of the exclusionary rule, and alternatives 
to the rule.165
When asked whether the threat of suppression of evidence influenced 
their conduct, the officers’ responses from both groups were not 
surprising. Nearly sixty percent believed suppression to be an important 
concern but not a primary concern.166 What did surprise us was that over 
eighteen percent of the respondents felt the threat of suppression was 
only a minor concern or no concern at all.167
Like Orfield, we were curious about the level of communication 
police officers received concerning suppression hearings, recognizing 
that if the rule is to have any specific deterrent effect, the offending 
 162. Perrin et al., supra note 11. This 1997 study was conducted by questionnaire that was 
sent to the Ventura County (California) Sheriff’s Department and each of the county’s five police 
departments: Oxnard, Port Hueneme, Santa Paula, Simi Valley, and Ventura. Of the 1144 law 
enforcement officers surveyed, 411 responded to the questionnaire. Id. at 712–13. 
 163. Id. at 713. The same questionnaire that was sent to Ventura County law enforcement 
officers was also sent to police officers throughout the state of California “who had recently attended 
a continuing education seminar at which they received instruction on search and seizure law and 
practice and police interrogation law and practice.” Id. The questionnaire received fifty-five 
responses out of a possible 270 officers, which is a twenty percent response rate. Id.  
 164. Id. at 713–14. To maximize officer participation, the survey was limited to “forty-five 
multiple-choice or fill-in-the-blank questions, requiring less than thirty minutes to complete.” Id. 
Also, in preparing the questions, input was solicited from “a broad cross-section of law enforcement 
officials and others in the criminal justice system.” Id. 
 165. Id. at 714–19. 
 166. Id. at 720. 
 167. Id. at 720–21. 
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officer must learn of the ruling and the reasons for it. Of all the officers 
surveyed, fifty-five percent admitted that on at least one occasion, 
evidence they had recovered had been excluded,168 and more than two-
thirds of the officers stated that they heard the ruling in court or were 
informed of the ruling by the prosecutor.169 Following up on this point, 
we analyzed the responses to ascertain if the officers who admitted past 
violations scored differently on the search and seizure questions from 
those officers who claimed to have never had evidence excluded. We 
found no statistically significant difference in the questionnaire results of 
the two groups.170 From this it could be concluded that there was no 
specific deterrent effect in terms of causing the officers to better 
understand the rules. 
As to police officer knowledge of the law of search and seizure, we 
found a widespread inability among the officers to correctly respond to 
the hypothetical questions concerning search and seizure law.171 The 
average number of correct responses to the four search and seizure 
questions and the question about the purpose of the exclusionary rule 
was 2.6 out of five.172 While educational background, rank, and 
experience did not necessarily affect performance, search and seizure 
education and training appeared to positively affect performance in 
answering the hypothetical questions correctly.173
We also surveyed the respondents concerning police perjury.174 
More than eighty percent of the study’s participants indicated they had 
 168. Id. at 722. 
 169. Id. at 722–23 (noting that 72.2% of the sheriff’s department participants and 69.5% of the 
police officers stated that they heard the court’s ruling in court or were informed of it by the 
prosecutor). “A total of 21 officers, just less than 5% of the total, answered that on at least one 
occasion they never learned of the court’s ruling after they testified.” Id. 
 170. Id. at 724–25.  
The officers without prior exclusions had a mean score of 2.86 on the five search and 
seizure hypotheticals and the question about the purpose of the rule, and those with prior 
exclusions had a mean score of 2.94. The .08 difference between the two groups is not 
statistically significant. In the police interrogation hypotheticals, the officers without prior 
exclusions had a mean score of 4.44 out of the six police interrogation questions, and 
those with prior exclusions had a mean score of 4.30. Thus, those with prior violations 
actually performed worse than the officers who had never had their evidence excluded, 
suggesting that the exclusionary rule has no specific deterrent effect, at least in terms of 
causing the officers to better understand the application of the rules.  
Id. 
 171. Id. at 727–32. 
 172. Id. at 728. 
 173. Id. at 730. 
 174. Id. at 725–27. 
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no knowledge of any officer attempting to avoid suppression by 
misrepresenting the facts.175 Such numbers may result from a reluctance 
to reveal such sensitive information, which is understandable. Further, to 
no surprise, those officers with more experience reported a greater 
number of perjury incidents than their less-experienced peers.176
The survey’s final area of inquiry concerned possible alternatives to 
the exclusionary rule. Not surprisingly, fifty-seven percent of the 
participants from both groups of officers indicated that the criminal 
justice system was well served by the current law.177 The more direct the 
sanction, the less popular it was with the respondents.178
4. Inherent weaknesses of exclusionary rule studies 
As Dallin Oaks noted in his groundbreaking 1970 study, the greatest 
difficulty in measuring the exclusionary rule’s deterrent effect is that 
studies attempting such measuring “all tend to oversimplify an 
enormously complex inquiry.”179 Oaks suggested that attempts to 
 175. Id. at 725. 
 176. Id. 
[T]he officers with the lowest average number of known instances of perjury were those 
with less than one year of experience (reporting no known instances) and the officers 
with the highest average were the most experienced officers (reporting 1.1697 known 
instances per officer). Similarly, those with the rank of ‘officer’ reported the lowest 
average (.4556 per officer), and those with a rank above detective reported the highest 
average (.7987 per officer). This trend held true for three of the four perjury questions. 
Id. 
 177. Id. at 732. 
[T]he most popular suggested alternative remedy was a requirement that officers attend 
educational courses on search and seizure or police interrogation with more than one-
third of the respondents choosing that option. The other options, which each involved 
significant adverse consequences to the police officer, were markedly less popular. In 
fact, their mere inclusion offended some of the officers and seemed unfair to others. 
About two out of ten officers were willing to entertain the possibility of implementing 
internal police discipline as a consequence of misconduct. The least popular option 
among the respondents was the criminal prosecution of an offending officer, including 
the possibility of incarceration. About one percent of the officers selected that option. A 
number of officers hedged their answers depending on the culpability of the officer, 
suggesting that stronger penalties were appropriate for intentional misconduct as opposed 
to good faith conduct. 
Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Oaks, supra note 136, at 715. Oaks examined the entire body of previous empirical 
work that had been done on the exclusionary rule. Id. at 678–709. Oaks also conducted his own 
original research after studying and analyzing arrest and conviction statistics from Cincinnati for a 
period of eleven years (five years before and six years after Mapp). Based on a significant drop in 
gambling convictions, Oaks concluded that, at least for gambling, there were “significant changes in 
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measure the effects of the rule involve “complicated inquiry into human 
motivation within a complex social model.”180 He was pessimistic that 
definitive findings could ever be reached and felt that at best we can 
“nibble around the edges of the problem by small inquiries that 
illuminate areas of special importance.”181 While it is true that the 
motivation and intent of law enforcement personnel evades direct 
observation and constitutes an imposing barrier to the study of the 
rule,182 we cannot just throw up our hands in despair. Even in the face of 
Oaks’s pessimism, there are some definitive findings as well as 
meaningful and useful conclusions to be drawn from the studies 
concerning the efficacy of the rule. 
5. Conclusions 
The three studies examined do call into question the effectiveness of 
the exclusionary rule in deterring police illegality and provide some 
insights into police knowledge of search and seizure law and police 
motivations to abide by that law. The results of the Heffernan & Lovely 
study and the Perrin, Caldwell, and Chase study indicate that the police 
are not particularly well-versed in Fourth Amendment law,183 which 
limits the amount of deterrence the rule can effectuate. As for the 
police behavior, which may have included closer adherence to constitutional standards of search and 
seizure.” Id. at 691. However, based on statistics regarding the seizures of both weapons and 
narcotics, Oaks found no significant changes in police behavior in the periods before and after 
Mapp. Id. at 694. 
 180. Id. at 715. Measuring the effects of the exclusionary rule is an extremely difficult task 
because in addition to trying to determine the effect the rule is having on the subjective intent of 
officers, those who study the rule’s effects are impeded by the officer’s hesitance to be completely 
honest in his or her answers. For example, police officers are likely to be hesitant to admit that they 
have lied in a suppression hearing or that they have crafted their version of the facts to ensure that 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion was present when it really was not. Additionally, while 
officers may feel that the rule hampers their ability to function as law enforcement officials, the 
police still prefer the rule over any type of direct sanction that may be imposed on them.  
 181. Id. at 716. 
 182. See id. at 715 (discussing the “breadth and complexity of the motivation problem”). Oaks 
recognized that any effort to gauge the rule’s effectiveness as a deterrent is limited by several factors 
that affect the deterrent effects of any sanction, including the differences among men, varieties of 
threatened behavior, differences in the way the threat is communicated, individual perceptions of the 
applicability and credibility of the threat, variations in threatened consequences, and the moral 
quality of the threatened individual. Id. Furthermore, Oaks noted that ‘the police’ is not a 
‘monolithic entity’ and that each individual within the department is going to be affected by his 
individual and unique assignment. Id. at 716. 
 183. See Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 11, at 332–33; Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 727–
32. 
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motivation to follow the rules, the results from all these studies are 
muddier still. While the police overwhelmingly endorse the idea of the 
rule, they believe that it cuts into their effectiveness because it has a 
chilling impact on their performance.184 Finally, the incidence of police 
perjury to avoid evidence exclusion is more than a minimum 
consideration.185
III. USING THE STATES AS LABORATORIES 
Because the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional question, change 
need not necessarily come from on high. Certainly the Supreme Court 
could further limit the scope of the rule or, for that matter, completely 
abandon the rule in favor of some new direction.186 But these options are 
not the only means of effectuating change. For example, Congress could 
step in and implement some new direction,187 or change could spring 
forth from more modest pedestals. Over seventy years ago, in the final 
paragraph of his dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,188 Justice 
Brandeis wrote: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system 
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country.”189 While Liebmann concerned the 
constitutionality of a state statute that prohibited the manufacture, sale, 
and distribution of ice without a license,190 Brandeis viewed the issue on 
 184. Orfield, supra note 11, at 1053–54. 
 185. Id. at 1049–50; Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 725–27. 
 186. See supra Part II.B. The Supreme Court has already limited the scope of the rule in many 
ways; undoubtedly it could continue on this path. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never 
indicated that exclusion is the only way to protect the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 92; see 
also infra notes 250–52. 
 187. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (Black, J., concurring). 
I agree with the conclusion of the Court that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” is enforceable against the states. Consequently, I 
should be for reversal of this case if I thought the Fourth Amendment not only prohibited 
“unreasonable searches and seizures,” but also, of itself, barred the use of evidence so 
unlawfully obtained. But I agree with what appears to be a plain implication of the 
Court’s opinion that the federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth 
Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate. 
Id. (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39–40 (1949) (Black, J., concurring)). 
 188. 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 
 189. Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 190. Id. at 271. New State Ice Company manufactured, sold, and distributed ice under a 
license issued by the Corporation Commission of Oklahoma. The Oklahoma legislature set forth an 
act that required such a license and the New State Ice Company brought this suit to enjoin Liebmann 
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a much broader scale—one that spoke to the genius of America’s federal 
system. He observed that “[t]here must be power in the States and the 
Nation to remould [sic], through experimentation, our economic 
practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic 
needs.”191 The Constitution Brandeis envisioned was “surely a ‘garment’ 
rather an ‘iron strait-jacket,’”192 and he believed that experimentation 
was a “means of uncovering the truth, and . . . that humans had the power 
to alter their destiny rather than simply being fated to endure it.”193
Brandeis’s observation built on the work of Alexis De Tocqueville, 
another influential observer of the American experiment nearly a century 
earlier.194 In his seminal work Democracy in America,195 De 
Tocqueville wrote that “[i]n large centralized nations the lawgiver is 
bound to give the laws a uniform character which does not fit the 
diversity of places and of mores.”196 It has also been said that “the 
history of American federal law in every era has reflected the adoption of 
the best—and occasionally the worst—of experiments first implemented 
from manufacturing, selling, or distributing ice in Oklahoma City without first obtaining the required 
license. Id. 
 191. Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 192. G. Edward White, Biographies of Titans: Holmes, Brandeis, and Other Obsessions: The 
Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis: Epistemology and Judicial Reputations, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
576, 603 (1995). White suggests that the Liebmann dissent revealed two facets of Brandeis’ judicial 
perspective: (1) the ability to see legal issues as social and economic realities, and (2) the belief that 
humans had the capacity “to alter purportedly inexorable external forces in a nation’s history. If 
economic difficulties existed because of ‘evils’ that had become embedded in the structure of 
American industry, those evils could be corrected.” Id. 
 193. Id. For Brandeis, the concept of experimentation demonstrated “his enthusiasm for 
empirical research—personified by economics and the physical sciences.” Id. 
 194. ANDREW J. CONSENTINO, A PASSION FOR LIBERTY: ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE ON 
DEMOCRACY AND REVOLUTION (1989), excerpts available at http://www.tocqueville.org/ 
chap1.htm. Tocqueville was “[a]n aristocratic Frenchman who came to the U.S. in 1831—when he 
was only 25 years old—and later wrote Democracy in America, a two-volume study of the American 
people and their political institutions. The book is frequently quoted by journalists and politicians.” 
Id. 
 195. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (George Lawrence trans., spec. ed., 
First Perennial Library 1988) (1835). 
 196. Id. at 161.  
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in the laboratory of the states.”197 Indeed, a diversity of thought and 
experiences has been a hallmark of American history.198
The notion of smaller units serving as laboratories for larger units 
predates the American Constitution. In many ways, the American 
Constitution itself was a product of that notion as it was built upon 
lessons learned from the constitutions of the original states.199 In seeking 
support for a national constitution, Alexander Hamilton stressed to his 
fellow New Yorkers that the proposed federal constitution would closely 
resemble New York’s state constitution.200  
This idea of state courts serving as laboratories for federal courts 
resurfaced most recently in Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Gonzales v. 
Raich.201 In Gonzales, the Court held that Congress had authority to 
regulate production of marijuana for medical use even after such use was 
deemed legal under California law.202 O’Connor’s dissent delved into 
the nature of state powers as well as overreaching federalism: 
This case exemplifies the role of States as laboratories. The States’ core 
police powers have always included authority to define criminal law 
and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. . . . Today 
the Court sanctions an application of the federal Controlled Substances 
Act that extinguishes [California’s] experiment. . . . [T]he Court 
announces a rule that gives Congress a perverse incentive to legislate 
broadly . . . nestling questionable assertions of its authority into 
comprehensive regulatory schemes—rather than with precision.203
 197. Frederick A.O. Schwartz, Jr., States and Cities as Laboratories of Democracy, Address at 
The Association of The Bar of the City of New York’s Conference: From the Ground Up: Local 
Lessons for National Reform (Nov. 9, 1988), in 54 THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR 
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 157, 160 (1994).  
 198. Id. Schwartz added that “[f]rom the birth of our most fundamental freedoms to the 
victims’ rights and environmental reforms of recent decades, the federal government frequently has 
followed in the footsteps of trailblazing states and cities.” Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2220–21 (2005) (O’Connor, J. dissenting). In his majority opinion, 
Justice Stevens stated, 
The question presented in this case is whether the power vested in Congress by Article I, 
§ 8, of the Constitution “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution” its authority to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States” includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of 
marijuana in compliance with California law. 
Id. at 2198–99 (majority opinion). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 2221 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
1CALDWELL.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006 12:36:00 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
32 
 
While echoing Brandeis’ call for experimentation, O’Connor expounded 
upon his concern with overreaching judicial power. Brandeis’ dissent in 
Liebmann “cautioned courts to resist interfering with the process of 
experimentation”204 and recognized that “[j]udges have a ‘grave 
responsibility’ when they exercise the power they have ‘to prevent an 
experiment.’”205 Brandeis warned that “[d]enial of the right to 
experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.”206
Brandeis’s “states-as-laboratories” metaphor has not been without 
criticism.207 Critics argue that “state policy experimentation is produced 
individually, haphazardly, and under circumstances that are unlikely to 
yield information suitable for use by other states.”208 Brandeis 
acknowledged those concerns, recognizing that experimentation had 
risks and required a process of “trial and error.”209 He maintained, 
 204. Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and Constitutional Rights, 
152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1751 (2004). Althouse opines that there are vanguard states and laggard 
states, and that each have affected the Court’s federalism doctrine in different ways. Brandeis 
believed in vanguard states that protected federalism through state autonomy and the ability to 
experiment with new ideas. 
 205. Id. 
 206. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
 207. James A. Gardner, The “States-As-Laboratories” Metaphor in State Constitutional Law, 
30 VAL. U. L. REV. 475 (1996). Since first appearing in 1932, Brandeis’s states-as-laboratories 
metaphor has been used in numerous court opinions and law review articles. Consequently, Gardner 
believes that the metaphor “deserves a skeptical reexamination” because its users have lost sight of 
its original meaning. Id. at 475. 
 208. Id. at 481–82. Gardner uses a hypothetical example, stating the following: 
  Suppose a state adopts a constitutional policy that protects personal privacy at the 
expense of apprehending criminals by strengthening its exclusionary rule. How ought 
judges in another state evaluate the success of such a policy? Even if it were possible to 
calculate the increase in crime directly attributable to an expanded exclusionary rule, how 
should judges weigh the marginally increased risk of crime against the marginal increase 
in personal freedom? Whether such a tradeoff has improved the quality of life in the 
state–that is, whether the “experiment” has succeeded–is the kind of judgment that only 
the people of that state are competent to make. 
  The subjectivity of state policy experimentation, and thus the irrelevance to other 
states of the information obtained through policy experiments, is only increased to the 
extent that, as is so often claimed, each state is unique. If the people of the different states 
have unique characters or values, for example, or if they live their lives under conditions 
different enough to affect the content of constitutional doctrine, then the usefulness of 
policy experimentation is to the same extent confined to the state’s borders. If life in 
Texas is really fundamentally different from life in California, it is hard to see how either 
state can learn much from the experiences of the other. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 209. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 310 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis saw experimentation as a 
process of trial and error. In his dissenting opinion, he used air travel as an example to further the 
notion that skepticism towards new ideas can be overcome through experimentation: “There are 
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however, that such experimentation confined the risks to just one 
state.210 When one state serves as a laboratory, it can experiment with 
new policies, “producing evidence about the effectiveness and 
workability of new programs, to be followed, improved upon, or avoided 
by the rest of the states, who can look upon [that] one state’s experiment 
and learn.”211 History is replete with examples such as “[u]nemployment 
compensation, minimum-wage laws, public financing of political 
campaigns, no-fault insurance, hospital cost containment, and 
prohibitions against discrimination in housing and employment, all [of 
which] originated in state legislatures.”212 Some proved to be successful 
national prototypes while others were found wanting.213
many men now living who were in the habit of using the age-old expression: ‘It is as impossible as 
flying.’ The discoveries in physical science, the triumphs in invention, attest the value of the process 
of trial and error.” Id. 
 210. Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Althouse, supra note 204, at 1745–46. 
Justice Louis Brandeis famously characterized the states as laboratories of democracy. 
The most appealing reason for courts to enforce limits on Congress and to preserve the 
role of autonomous states is the prediction that states will in fact experiment with new 
policies, looking for new ways to serve the public good, putting new ideas into practice, 
and producing evidence about the effectiveness and workability of new programs, to be 
followed, improved upon, or avoided by the rest of the states, who can look upon one 
state’s experiment and learn. 
Id. 
 211. Althouse, supra note 204, at 1746. 
 212. Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a 
Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988). 
Both the language and history of the guarantee clause support the conclusion that the 
clause prohibits the federal government from interfering with state sovereignty in a 
manner that would destroy republican government in the states. . . . [T]he guarantee 
clause produces a workable concept of federalism—one that preserves the values of 
independent state governments without denying the federal government the power to 
address compelling national concerns. 
Id. at 36. 
 213. Id. While unemployment compensation, minimum-wage laws, public financing of 
political campaigns, and prohibitions against discrimination in housing and employment have all 
been implemented on a national level, no-fault insurance and hospital cost containment are two 
examples of state-tested policies that have not been adopted nationally. 
1CALDWELL.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006 12:36:00 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
34 
 
Brandeis challenged both states and judges to be “bold.”214 His 
dissent argued for “trusting government experimenters with their ‘novel’ 
ideas and refraining from serving mere ‘prejudices’—as opposed to true 
‘principles’—which the ‘high power’ of review judges have designed for 
themselves.”215 He urged courts to allow the “single courageous 
State”216 to experiment rather than being complacent with their own 
preconceived principles.217
Yet state courts are still hesitant to “experiment” because they are 
often unsure of the limits placed on their power.218 State court judges 
often conform their role to the federal model thinking that it provides the 
proper guideline.219 Helen Hershkoff argues, however, that “state 
systems should take an independent and pragmatic approach to judicial 
authority in order to facilitate and support their integral and vibrant role 
in state governance.”220 State courts abide by a national law when they 
are uncertain if they have the power to experiment,221 and perhaps, in 
 214. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Brandeis 
concluded, 
This Court has the power to prevent an experiment. We may strike down the statute 
which embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious 
or unreasonable. We have the power to do this, because the due process clause has been 
held by the Court applicable to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of 
procedure. But in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we 
erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we 
must let our minds be bold. 
Id. 
 215. Id.; see also Althouse, supra note 204, at 1751–52. 
 216. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
 217. Id.; see also Althouse, supra note 204, at 1751–52. 
 218. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial 
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001). Hershkoff addresses justiciability and, more specifically, 
the interplay between federal judges and state courts. Id. Hershkoff recognizes the trepidation of 
state courts and suggests that the federal judiciary maintains a “posture of judicial restraint.” Id. at 
1898. She goes on to observe that “[b]y staying its hand, the Court affords states and localities the 
space necessary to remedy constitutional violations through ‘the political process established by the 
citizens of the State’ rather than ‘by judicial decree mandated by Federal Government and invoked 
by the private citizen.’” Id. at 1899 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999)). State courts 
provide citizens with an avenue to influence the laws that govern and benefit society as whole. Id. at 
1899–1900. 
 219. Id. at 1875–76. State courts can accord greater protection to individual rights, but they 
cannot lessen the protection provided by the United States Constitution. Consequently, state judges 
often look to the federal model for guidance even when federal law is not applicable. Hershkoff 
recognized that “many state court judges conform their role to Article III limits, on the view that the 
federal model reflects the proper measure of the adjudicative function.” Id. 
 220. Id. at 1941. 
 221. Id. at 1875–76. 
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part, it is that uncertainty that accounts for the lack of state-driven 
innovation regarding the exclusionary rule. Ironically, however, the 
Court has left the door ajar with regard to this particular remedy. Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the majority in the 1995 case Arizona v. Evans 
said, “[t]he Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly 
precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its 
commands.”222 Rehnquist viewed the exclusionary rule’s remedy and 
Fourth Amendment rights as “separate” issues.223 The exclusionary rule, 
he wrote, was “designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth 
Amendment rights through its deterrent effects.”224 It was never 
intended to be an absolute mandate.225 Instead, “[a]s with any remedial 
device, the rule’s application has been restricted to those instances where 
its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. Where ‘the 
exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, 
its use . . . is unwarranted.’”226 This is nothing short of a plea for 
something else, something better. What better time and what better tool 
than the state laboratories to experiment, to try something new and 
beyond the current approach. 
Justice Brandeis was hopeful that state-court laboratories could spark 
change where change was needed.227 His words serve as a challenge to 
the courts and the country to embrace change rather than reject it: “It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
 222. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995). The Supreme Court in United States v. Leon 
noted that “[t]he wrong condemned by the Amendment is ‘fully accomplished’ by the unlawful 
search or seizure itself.” 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 
354 (1974)). The Court goes on to say that “the use of the fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure 
‘[works] no new Fourth Amendment wrong.’” Id. (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354). 
 223. Evans, 514 U.S. at 10; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983) (“The question 
whether the exclusionary rule’s remedy is appropriate in a particular context has long been regarded 
as an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to 
invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.”). 
 224. Evans, 514 U.S. at 11; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 906; Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. 
 225. Evans, 514 U.S. at 11; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 927 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(“Because I share the view that the exclusionary rule is not a constitutionally compelled corollary of 
the Fourth Amendment itself . . . I see no way to avoid making an empirical judgment of this sort, 
and I am satisfied that the Court has made the correct one on the information before it.”). See supra 
note 92, infra notes 247, and 291–92 and accompanying text for more language from the Court 
indicating that the rule is not a constitutional corollary. 
 226. Evans, 514 U.S. at 11 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)); see also 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 908; Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. 
 227. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”228
IV. BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE 
What then of this change? How might it be initiated? The purpose of 
this Part is to offer a guide for how one prosecutor in one state court 
reviewing the actions of one police officer might begin to effectuate 
much-needed movement away from the exclusionary rule. First, Section 
A introduces the facts of the fictional case and the consequences to the 
offending officer. Section B then goes through a fictional suppression 
hearing based on the case, demonstrating the arguments that can be made 
at pretrial for nonapplication of the exclusionary rule. Finally, Section C 
demonstrates how a prosecutor, successful at the trial level, can defend 
the trial court’s decision at the appellate level. 
A. The Investigation and Search 
Detective Todrick,229 chief narcotics investigator for the Alpine 
County Sheriff’s Department,230 received an anonymous call that two 
people were operating a methamphetamine lab from a residence in 
Markleeville, California.231 The caller specified the street address of the 
house but hung up before providing any further information including the 
names of the people or how the caller had come into possession of this 
information. 
Detective Todrick and his partner, Senior Deputy Weaver, undertook 
a records check of the specified house and learned that it was purchased 
by Robert and Laurel Johnson two years earlier, that Robert Johnson had 
previously served ninety days in jail for being under the influence of 
heroin,232 and that he had successfully completed three years of 
 228. Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 229. All references in this hypothetical criminal investigation, suppression hearing, and 
appellate hearing are fictional. 
 230. Alpine County is a small, sparsely populated area located in Northern California along 
the crest of the central Sierra Nevada. The county consists of snow-covered mountain peaks, high 
alpine meadows, and forests. In 2004, Alpine County had a population of 1190, which is generally 
concentrated in a few small communities. Most residents of Alpine County enjoy a rural lifestyle, 
but the major cities of San Francisco, Sacramento, and Reno are all less than four hours away. 
 231. Markleeville is the county seat of Alpine County, California. 
 232. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11550(a) (Deering 2005) (“No person shall use, or 
be under the influence of any controlled substance . . . . Any person convicted of violating this 
subdivision is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 
days or more than one year in a county jail.”). 
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probation. No further criminal involvement was reported on either 
individual and there were no outstanding warrants. A vehicle check 
revealed an older model Chevy truck registered to Robert Johnson and a 
2005 Saturn registered to both Robert and Laurel Johnson. 
Todrick and Weaver interviewed several neighbors living on the 
same residential block as the Johnsons and learned that the Johnsons 
primarily kept to themselves and had little interaction with their 
neighbors. The investigators also learned that Laurel Johnson left each 
weekday morning and appeared to be employed. Robert Johnson did not 
leave the house often and did not appear to have outside employment. 
Two twenty-four hour stakeouts revealed no unusual activity and after 
several days the investigation gave way to more pressing matters. 
Two months later, Detective Todrick received another anonymous 
call and he recognized the voice as the same person who had made the 
original call reporting the Johnsons. In an agitated voice, the speaker 
said, “Bobby is cooking the hell out of that stuff, and you guys are doing 
nothing.” 
Todrick asked, “Who is this? How do you know that?” 
The caller responded, “All you need to know is that I know these 
people, and I know what they are doing, and I don’t want this happening 
in my neighborhood.” He then hung up. 
Three days later, Todrick, having finished other business and finding 
himself in the vicinity of the Johnson neighborhood, opted to drive to the 
Johnson residence. He approached the house and knocked on the door. 
After getting no response, he knocked again but still received no 
response. Todrick walked to the side of the house near the detached 
garage and began to hear sounds emanating from the garage. Todrick 
called out, “Police. Come out.” Hearing no response he called out again 
in a loud voice, but received no response. He opened the six-foot side 
gate abutting the garage and entered the fully fenced side and backyard 
where he peered through a partially covered window in the side door of 
the garage. Through the window, Detective Todrick saw a man (later 
identified as Johnson) pouring a clear liquid from one container to 
another. Todrick observed that the rear hatch of a truck parked in the 
garage was open and he recognized that it was a mobile 
methamphetamine lab.233 Todrick pushed open the door and ordered 
 233. California Attorney General Bill Lockyer, Meth Labs: California’s Hidden Danger (May 
2001), available at http://safestate.org/index-print.cfm?navid=240 (“Meth labs have been found in 
hotels, motels, self-storage units, boats, nice homes, shabby homes, in the back of pickup trucks, 
picnic baskets, ice chests, in parks, by the road and in many other places.”). 
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Johnson to lie on the floor. Johnson was taken into custody and all items 
in the garage associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine were 
seized.234
Alpine County Deputy District Attorney Sarah Alper reviewed 
Todrick’s report concerning the Johnson arrest and seizure of the meth 
lab and determined that Todrick’s actions violated the Fourth 
Amendment. She believed the case against Johnson would not survive a 
suppression motion;235 however, after weighing the societal costs of 
allowing a methamphetamine bootlegger to be freed and, most likely, go 
on about his business, versus the nature of the Fourth Amendment 
violation, Alper was reluctant to reject the case for criminal 
prosecution.236 She requested that Detective Todrick come to her office 
to better determine the circumstances of the search and seizure and to 
assess the detective’s mindset as he entered the side yard and looked 
through the garage window. 
From her interview with Todrick, Alper learned that Todrick felt 
justified in entering the side yard because he had received two 
anonymous phone calls accusing Johnson of maintaining a meth lab, he 
had verified that Johnson had a previous narcotics conviction, he had 
confirmed that Johnson did not appear to be employed outside of his 
home, and because he heard noise coming from the garage but received 
no response when he had announced that a police officer was present. 
Todrick thought that he had probable cause to believe that there was 
contraband in Johnson’s garage and that this was sufficient to get him 
into the garage without a warrant. Todrick also told Alper that once he 
saw the mobile lab located in the truck he was concerned that the 
incriminating evidence may well be gone prior to his opportunity to 
 234. Id. (indicating that evidence of a meth lab includes “laboratory equipment (glass tubes, 
beakers, Bunsen Burners), funnels, [e]vidence of large quantities of cold medications or non-
prescription weight loss products, [a] [l]arge number of discarded blister packages or plastic bottles 
with the bottoms cut out, [c]hemical cans or drums in the yard . . . [and] [f]ortifications on houses or 
outbuildings, such as heavily barred windows or doors.”). 
 235. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(a)(1)(A) (Deering 2005) (“A defendant may move for 
the return of property or to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result 
of a search or seizure on . . . the following grounds: The search or seizure without a warrant was 
unreasonable.”). 
 236. In California, unlike a number of other jurisdictions, all cases are presented by the 
involved police agency to the prosecutor’s office. Following the presentation, the prosecutor’s office 
decides whether to file charges against the suspect. 
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secure a search warrant.237 After further questioning, however, it was 
clear that Todrick had no reason to believe Johnson planned to leave. 
Based on her interview, D.D.A. Alper concluded that Todrick’s 
actions were unintentional violations of the Fourth Amendment.238 
Furthermore, she believed that a reasonable police officer in Todrick’s 
position would have known that simple probable cause was not enough 
to get into a suspect’s garage without a warrant. Alper contacted the 
Alpine County Sheriff’s Department and reported her conclusions that 
Todrick had violated Johnson’s Fourth Amendment rights and may 
benefit from additional search and seizure training. As a result of her 
recommendation, the sheriff’s department suspended Todrick for two 
days without pay, required him both to complete twenty hours of search 
and seizure training on his own time and to successfully complete a 
search and seizure examination. Todrick completed his course hours and 
examination within the month. 
In light of the department’s actions in sanctioning Todrick and 
convinced that his errors had been unintentional, Alper felt confident that 
Todrick, as a result of his sanction and additional training, would better 
conform his future actions to the laws of search and seizure. Reasoning 
that exclusion would serve no additional deterrent benefit, she filed 
felony drug charges against Robert Johnson despite the Fourth 
Amendment violations. 
B. The Suppression Hearing 
In response to Alper’s drug charges, Johnson’s privately retained 
defense counsel, Gene Bishop, filed a motion to suppress everything 
seized from the Johnson garage. He supported his motion with prevailing 
search and seizure law. 
 237. The Supreme Court has consistently held that there is a decreased expectation of privacy 
in vehicles and that because of the mobility of vehicles, police are entitled to conduct an immediate 
search of a vehicle as long as there is probable cause to believe contraband is in the vehicle. 
Furthermore, unlike the search incident to lawful arrest, there is no contemporaneous requirement 
for a vehicle search. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Caroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132 (1925); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (holding that police officers 
may search containers within a car as long as their search is supported by probable cause). 
 238. Although Todrick’s actions were unintentional violations of the Fourth Amendment, 
Alper was convinced that the case did not fall under the Leon good-faith exception because a 
reasonable officer in Todrick’s position would have known that more than simple probable cause 
was needed to get inside Johnson’s garage. Rather than being mistaken regarding the facts, Todrick 
was mistaken regarding the law in this case, and his mistaken belief was not a reasonable one. 
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D.D.A. Alper filed a response to the motion, conceding that 
Detective Todrick had violated Johnson’s Fourth Amendment rights by 
entering the side yard and looking into the garage without first obtaining 
a search warrant.239 But, Alper argued, it would be inappropriate under 
the circumstances of this case to exclude the contraband since the 
offending officer had already been sanctioned, retrained, and presumably 
deterred from any future violations of the Fourth Amendment. Alper’s 
brief included an affidavit from Todrick in which he admitted that he was 
mistaken in entering the Johnson’s yard and further that he erred in 
proceeding with the search and seizure of Johnson’s garage. 
Additionally, in his affidavit Todrick described his suspension and 
confirmed that prior to reinstatement, he had completed twenty hours of 
search and seizure training and a search and seizure examination. 
Todrick further swore that as a result of the departmental sanctions, he 
felt better prepared and better able to comply with the laws of search and 
seizure. Alper also included an affidavit from Todrick’s superior officer, 
which indicated that Todrick had, in fact, received a nonreimbursed 
suspension and had successfully completed the search and seizure 
training and examination. 
Superior Court Judge Miles Slaughter presided at the suppression 
hearing.240
 239. Detective Todrick’s actions were a violation of the Fourth Amendment because mere 
probable cause is not enough to allow officers to legally enter a suspect’s home. See Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (explaining that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit police 
officers from making warrantless and nonconsensual entries into a suspect’s home in order to make a 
felony arrest). Instead, the police must either have a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances in 
order to get into someone’s home. Exigent circumstances include hot pursuit, probable cause to 
believe contraband is in the house and that the evidence is in the process of being destroyed, 
protective sweep, and imminent threat to human life. See also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 
(2001) (explaining that police officers may detain a suspect for a reasonable amount of time until a 
search warrant is obtained); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (explaining that police 
officers may enter only to freeze a premises until a search warrant is obtained). Here, none of the 
exigent circumstances were present when Detective Todrick decided to unlawfully enter the side 
yard and look into Mr. Johnson’s garage. 
 240. B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW: ILLEGALLY 
OBTAINED EVIDENCE § 360 (3d ed. 2000). 
The judge or magistrate is required to receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to 
determine the motion. (P.C. 1538.5(c).) . . . . The defendant has the initial burden of 
producing evidence to make out a prima facie case of an illegal search or seizure . . . . 
The burden is on the prosecution to establish by a preponderance of evidence the facts 
justifying a warrantless search. . . . It is defendant’s initial burden to raise a Fourth 
Amendment issue, which is done by a suppression motion. Usually, the law imposes the 
burden of proof on the party bringing a motion. That burden is satisfied in a suppression 
motion by showing that the search was conducted without a warrant. A warrantless 
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Judge Slaughter: Let the record reflect that we are on the record in 
the matter of the People v. Robert Johnson. Mr. Johnson is present in 
court and represented by Mr. Bishop. The People are represented by Ms. 
Alper. Ms. Alper, I read your response to the 1538.5 motion.241 Am I 
correct in assuming that you are conceding that the evidence against Mr. 
Johnson was illegally obtained? 
Prosecutor Alper: That’s correct, your Honor, but for the reasons I 
set forth in my response to defense counsel’s motion I don’t believe that 
exclusion of the evidence in this case is appropriate. If I might 
explain . . . 
Judge Slaughter: Hold on for a moment. I need to make certain I 
fully appreciate what you are asking this Court to do. Now correct me if 
I’m wrong. Is it your position that despite the fact that the government is 
conceding that all the evidence against the accused was the direct fruit of 
an illegal search and seizure, you believe the evidence should survive a 
suppression hearing? 
Prosecutor: That is my position as well as the position of my office. 
Defense Counsel Bishop: May I be heard? 
Judge: Of course. 
Defense Counsel: Judge, as you are well aware, the prosecutor’s 
position flies in the face of two generations of law.242 No less authority 
than the United States Supreme Court has flat out told us that when a 
Fourth Amendment violation occurs, the fruits of that violation should be 
excluded.243 What the government is seeking is unprecedented and 
unwarranted. 
Judge: I will agree with you that the prosecutor’s position is 
unprecedented, but I’m not so certain it is unwarranted. Refusing to 
exclude an entire methamphetamine lab because a detective walked into 
the defendant’s yard and looked in a garage window does not necessarily 
strike me as unwarranted. But, be that as it may, I’m still stuck on 
unprecedented. Ms. Alper speak to that. 
search is presumptively unreasonable; hence, the burden of justification [shifts to] the 
prosecution. But . . . [i]t is not enough to assert the search was without a warrant; 
defendant also must show that it was unreasonable. 
Id. 
 241. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
 242. The Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule for use in state courts in 1961. See 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see also supra Part II.A. 
 243. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. 
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Prosecutor: Your Honor, going back and examining Mapp v. Ohio, 
it seems fairly clear that the Supreme Court felt compelled to take strong 
action in light of the particularly egregious police conduct in that 
case.244 As this Court is well aware, the overriding policy in Mapp was 
deterrence from future illegal police conduct.245 The thinking was that 
excluding the evidence found as a result of police error would compel 
officers to conform their future conduct to the law.246 However, the 
Mapp Court never mandated that exclusion be the sole means to that 
end.247
Judge: Is it your suggestion, Counselor, that there is some flexibility 
in how courts go about enforcing the Fourth Amendment? 
Prosecutor: Judge, the goal is police deterrence. If we can deter 
future violations in some way that doesn’t have the extreme 
consequences of exclusion, shouldn’t we try? 
 244. See id. at 644 (describing the officers as being in “defiance of the law”). The Court also 
went into an extensive discussion of the facts surrounding Ms. Mapp’s arrest, something the Court 
did not do in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) when it refused to apply the exclusionary rule to 
the states. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644–45. Moreover, the Court noted that the government, which is 
charged with enforcing the law, should not be allowed to become a lawbreaker. Id. at 659. In 
concluding its decision, the Court refused to permit the Fourth Amendment’s protections to “remain 
an empty promise.” Id. at 660. 
 245. Id. at 656 (noting that the “purpose of the . . . rule ‘is to deter’” (quoting Elkins v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960))). Furthermore, the Court said that the federal exclusionary rule 
was designed to be a “deterrent safeguard.” Id. at 648. 
 246. Id. at 656 (stating that the exclusionary rule was meant “to deter—to compel respect for 
the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to 
disregard it” (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217)). The Court believed that officers had an incentive to 
violate constitutional rights and that this disregard for personal liberties could be prevented through 
the use of the exclusionary rule because nothing else seemed to be working. Id. at 652–53. 
 247. In Mapp, the Court never stated that the use of an exclusionary rule was the only method 
states could use to deter violations of the Fourth Amendment. The Mapp Court merely believed, 
without the support of any reliable statistical evidence, that it was the only effective deterrent. Id. at 
651–52. Furthermore, in his concurring opinion Justice Black reiterated his belief “that the Federal 
exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of 
evidence which Congress might negate.” Id. at 661 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black had 
previously expressed this view in his concurring opinion in Wolf, 338 U.S. at 39–40 (Black, J., 
concurring). Furthermore, in the majority opinion of Wolf, the Court seemed to be suggesting that 
Congress should take action regarding the exclusionary rule. See id. at 33. For example, the Court’s 
opinion ends with the following curious statement: “And though we have interpreted the Fourth 
Amendment to forbid the admission of such evidence, a different question would be presented if 
Congress under its legislative powers were to pass a statute purporting to negate the Weeks 
doctrine.” Id. 
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Defense Counsel: By what authority? Since Mapp, every trial court 
in every state has excluded the fruit of bad searches,248 and here this 
prosecutor is asking this Court to go directly against, what, forty, forty-
five years of precedent. Judge, this is ludicrous and should be rejected 
out of hand. 
Prosecutor: May I? 
Judge: Go ahead. 
Prosecutor: Thank you. If I might, I would like to step back. Justice 
Blackmun in his concurring opinion in the Leon case in 1984 suggested 
that “the scope of the exclusionary rule is subject to change in light of 
changing judicial understanding about the effects of the rule outside the 
confines of the courtroom.”249 I want to suggest . . . 
Judge: Ms. Alper, excuse me, but is that a call you want me to 
make? Isn’t that more appropriately decided at the appellate level? 
Prosecutor: With all due respect, Your Honor, the appellate courts 
need something to work with. Why not this case? We don’t have 
egregious police conduct, we have unintentional error. The effects of 
exclusion would work a grave hardship on justice if this defendant, a 
man engaged in the wholesale manufacturer and distribution of a 
dangerous and illegal drug, is allowed to walk away from his conduct, 
free to set up shop in some other neighborhood. 
Judge: Well, without getting into the nature of the police 
misconduct, I will suggest that excluding evidence probative of a crime 
is something I have always been loath to do. But I still come back to the 
same basic question: what authority does a lone trial judge, sitting in a 
small, rural, northern California county, have to break with the U.S. 
Supreme Court? 
Prosecutor: The Supreme Court has never mandated exclusion as 
the sole remedy.250 What the Court has stated is that law enforcement 
 248. Defense Counsel Bishop’s statement here is not completely correct. While the Court has 
kept the exclusionary rule since 1961, it has varied considerably regarding the situations in which the 
rule will apply. See supra Part II.B. 
 249. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 250. See supra note 92 and infra note 262; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 905. 
The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence 
obtained in violation of its commands, and an examination of its origin and purposes 
makes clear that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure “[works] no new 
Fourth Amendment wrong.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354, 94 S.Ct. 613, 
623, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). The wrong condemned by the Amendment is “fully 
accomplished” by the unlawful search or seizure itself, and the exclusionary rule is 
neither intended nor able to “cure the invasion of the defendant’s rights which he has 
already suffered.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048, 49 L.Ed.2d 
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officials need to be deterred from future violations.251 That is the 
essence of Mapp, and I am suggesting that in this case, you can 
accomplish that goal without resorting to exclusion. 
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, Mapp created a level of individual 
protection and the prosecutor’s proposal falls below that minimal level of 
protection guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.252
Prosecutor: Counsel misinterprets the nature of the exclusionary 
rule. The rule is simply a remedy, not a right or a liberty.253 The affected 
right or liberty is freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; there 
is no right to have evidence excluded.254
Judge: Moving back to the question of whether a trial court has the 
authority to do as you propose, shouldn’t such a departure from the 
accepted practice come from the Supreme Court itself or through 
legislative channels? 
Prosecutor: Taking the questions in turn. As I’ve already suggested, 
the Supreme Court never mandated exclusion as the sole remedy.255 
Should this Court find that the deterrence policy of Mapp was met, the 
Court has fulfilled its obligation under Mapp.256 As for legislation, the 
1067 (1976). The rule thus operates as a “judicially created remedy” designed to 
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a 
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. United States v. Calandra, supra, 414 
U.S., at 348, 94 S.Ct., at 620. 
Id. at 906. 
 251. See supra notes 72–87 and accompanying text for a summary of the Court’s rationale in 
Mapp. 
 252. The Defense Counsel is incorrect in assuming that Mapp created an individual level of 
protection guaranteed by the Due Process Clause because the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional 
right. The rule is merely a remedy designed to deter the violation of individual constitutional rights. 
See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (“Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never 
been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all 
persons. As with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas 
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.”). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 255. See supra note 92 and infra note 262.  
 256. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984). The Court states that “suppression of 
evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in 
those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.” Id. 
Furthermore, the Court continued by stating that 
[i]f the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then 
evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law 
enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the 
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 
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exclusionary rule was a judicial creation and, as suggested by Justice 
Blackman, it “is subject to change in light of changing judicial 
understanding.”257
Judge Slaughter, we know a lot more than we did in 1961 about 
whether this bold exclusion experiment would deter the police. And what 
we have learned is that because of the indirect nature of the sanction, it is 
largely ineffectual as a deterrent.258
Defense Counsel: Judge, I took the liberty, in preparation for this 
hearing, to read some of the studies discussed in the People’s brief, and I 
am unconvinced that we have evidence that the exclusionary rule has 
failed to deter police misconduct.259 Several authors of the various 
studies were candid and remarked that determining human motivations in 
such a complex endeavor is difficult and uncertain.260
Prosecutor: Your Honor, Mr. Bishop has it half right. Testing is 
difficult, but the studies, while not completely conclusive, do not support 
the idea that the exclusionary rule accomplishes the goal of future police 
deterrence.261 Because the rule does nothing to directly sanction police 
officers, it does not seem to accomplish what the Court had hoped for, 
and yet the criminal justice system is left holding the bag when probative 
and incriminating evidence of guilt is blocked from trial. Judge, the 
Id. at 919 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975)); see also Arizona v. Evans, 
514 U.S. 1, 11 (1995) (citing Janis, 428 U.S. at 454); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 
(1976) (“If . . . the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in 
the instant situation is unwarranted.”). 
 257. Leon, 468 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 258. See supra Part II.C. Some of the studies actually found that instead of deterring police 
misconduct, the rule works to encourage police perjury in order to avoid suppression of valuable 
evidence. Furthermore, because the rule’s harsh effects fall mainly on the prosecutor, one study 
found that eighteen percent of officers surveyed believed the rule was a minimal concern or no 
concern at all. See Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 721. 
 259. See Orfield, supra note 11, at 1033–34. See also supra note 169 and accompanying text 
for findings indicating that officers do learn when evidence they have seized is excluded and that 
they generally understand the basis for such suppression. See also Orfield, supra note 11, at 1017, 
1039 (stating that the exclusionary rule “has educated police officers in the requirements of the 
fourth amendment”); Effect of Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 136, at 102 (noting that police departments 
increased their post-academy training efforts). 
 260. See supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulties 
surrounding any study that attempts to gauge the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule. 
 261. See Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 710–11 (stating that most of the studies “strongly 
undermine support for the exclusionary rule as a cost-effective deterrent for police misconduct”); see 
also Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 11, at 345–50 (citing a high percentage of officers who would 
violate Fourth Amendment law). 
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victim here is society because the defendant will be free to go back into 
the community and once again go about his awful business. 
Judge: Moving back to the central question, what message am I 
sending to law enforcement if I turn a blind eye to the officer’s illegal 
conduct? 
Defense Counsel: That’s exactly right judge, if courts don’t exclude 
this tainted evidence there is no sanction for police misconduct. The 
Fourth Amendment is, once again, left unprotected just as it was prior to 
Mapp, and, once again, the police will be free to trample the rights of 
citizens. 
I am required to point out that what the prosecutor is asking this 
Court to do is unprecedented and should be rejected out of hand. 
Prosecutor: Why should my proposal be rejected out of hand? 
Aren’t we dealing with serious enough issues that merit thoughtful 
dialogue? Before this Court excludes evidence of an entire 
methamphetamine lab, isn’t it worth several moments of everyone’s time 
to see if there is some better way to protect Fourth Amendment 
guarantees than such an odious and extreme approach? 
I would like to turn back to a question Your Honor proposed about 
what kind of message this Court would be sending to law enforcement if 
you did not exclude this evidence. First of all, you would not be turning a 
blind eye to police misconduct. If anything, judges like you would 
become integral to a process whereby we actually do something to 
remediate police behavior so that they will, in fact, comport their conduct 
to the law. Instead of excluding evidence, which as we all know works 
only in the most indirect way against the involved officers, this Court 
would examine what direct actions have been taken against the officer to 
better ensure that there will be compliance in the future. For instance, in 
this case the officer was suspended without pay. Additionally, his 
department mandated he engage in twenty hours of search and seizure 
law training on his own time and then successfully complete an exam on 
search and seizure before he was allowed to resume his duties. Your 
Honor, these are direct consequences of the officer’s behavior. These 
sanctions provide a real incentive for him to act according to the law in 
the future. If, on the other hand, the Court feels the officer’s department 
has not done enough to ensure future compliance from the offending 
officer, you reserve the power to suggest further sanctions or to simply 
exclude the evidence on a case-by-case basis. 
Let’s compare this scenario with the “typical” case where the officer 
testifies at the suppression hearing, the evidence is excluded and 
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everyone goes on about their business. The offending officer may or may 
not even learn of the ruling, and even if he does, he most likely will 
shrug it off as just another instance of the screwed up criminal justice 
system. Judge, you can make a difference. 
Judge: I must say I am impressed by the actions of the department in 
this case. It shows a commitment to the rule of law and I agree with you, 
Ms. Alper, that there is a very real disincentive for this officer to engage 
in this type of behavior in the future. 
Defense Counsel: Excuse me, Judge, but I couldn’t disagree more. Is 
that the response to police misconduct—whenever there is a threat of 
losing evidence let’s just give the officer some days off and save the 
case? How disingenuous is that? Is the Fourth Amendment to be trifled 
with? 
Prosecutor: Judge, under Mapp as it stands, it is for you to 
determine whether the remedial actions of the involved department are 
genuine. If you determine that there is no departmental commitment to 
better train and discipline officers, exclusion is always your prerogative. 
What I suggest is that under this approach, law enforcement agencies 
will feel that they are directly accountable for their officer’s actions, and 
the departments themselves will now have a greater incentive for their 
officers to do the job right. 
Judge: So under your scheme, trial judges are put in the position of 
determining whether departmental sanctions against offending officers 
are sufficient to induce officers to comply with the law? 
Prosecutor: Yes, Your Honor. The goal here is to ensure officer 
compliance. What better way than to bring the involved police agencies 
into the equation? If the agency has done a poor job of hiring or training 
its officers, that agency must bear the brunt of public criticism. When a 
judge, convinced that an officer and his department are not committed to 
following the law, is forced to exclude evidence, public criticism and 
public pressure will focus on the police agency instead of the judge. We 
are creating an environment where those in the best position to ensure 
lawful police conduct are held accountable. 
Judge: Speaking for myself and other judges who are occasionally in 
the difficult position of having to exclude relevant and probative 
evidence, I appreciate shifting the responsibility for proper police 
behavior from the courts, who can have only an indirect impact, to the 
law enforcement agencies, who can directly impact officer behavior. 
Defense Counsel: So under this scheme, the court is going to 
become the de facto supervisor of the police departments? 
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Prosecutor: Not at all. During the hearing, the court would first 
determine if the proffered evidence was obtained as a result of Fourth 
Amendment violation. If it was, the judge will receive evidence as to 
what, if any, remedial action has been instituted to ensure future 
compliance. If the judge is satisfied, the evidence is not excluded. If the 
judge is not satisfied, he or she can exclude and point the finger of 
responsibility directly to the involved agency. 
Judge: I am still troubled by the fact that the approach you are 
suggesting would apply the exclusionary rule to only certain instances of 
police misconduct, but not all instances. 
Prosecutor: Your Honor, the Supreme Court has drawn such 
distinctions. As you recall from the Leon case, the Court looked at the 
nature of the error and determined that reasonable good faith error should 
not result in exclusion.262
Judge: But as I also recall from Leon, the Court determined that the 
judge authorizing the search warrant erred, not the police.263
Prosecutor: You are absolutely right, Judge. Consequently, in Leon 
the evidence was not excluded because exclusion would have in no way 
deterred the police because it was the judge who erred.264
Judge: But you are not suggesting that Detective Todrick made a 
good faith error here are you? 
Prosecutor: No. 
Judge: Rather you are suggesting here that since police misconduct 
in this case was not intentional but was unreasonable, your proposed 
remedy would be appropriate. Why draw distinctions between the types 
 262. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 907–08. 
Particularly when law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith . . . the 
magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of 
the criminal justice system. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S., at 490, 96 S.Ct., at 3051. 
Indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule, therefore, may well “generat[e] 
disrespect for the law and administration of justice.” Id. at 491, 96 S.Ct., at 3051. 
Accordingly, “[a]s with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been 
restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously 
served.” United States v. Calandra, supra, 414 U.S., at 348, 94 S.Ct., at 670; see Stone v. 
Powell, supra, 428 U.S., at 486–487, 96 S.Ct., at 3048–3049; United States v. Janis, 428 
U.S. 433, 447, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3028, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976).
Id. at 908. The Leon court goes on to suggest that “the exclusionary rule be more generally modified 
to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or 
seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 909 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 255 (1983) (White, J., concurring)). 
 263. See id. at 903. 
 264. See id. at 921 (“Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, 
cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.”). 
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of police misconduct? Isn’t Fourth Amendment error Fourth Amendment 
error? 
Prosecutor: Your question goes to the central issue here—the issue 
of deterrence. I am suggesting that officers who have unintentionally 
violated a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights would appear to be better 
candidates to learn from their mistakes and conform their conduct to the 
Fourth Amendment than those officers who intentionally engage in 
misconduct. It could be that direct intradepartment sanctions and 
reeducation could remediate both those who unintentionally and 
intentionally err. But that is not an issue we need to resolve in this case 
because I believe Detective Todrick unreasonably thought that, under the 
circumstances, he was justified in stepping into the side yard and looking 
through the window. 
The goal of the exclusionary rule is to give teeth to the Fourth 
Amendment by deterring police misconduct. Detective Todrick suffered 
direct sanctions and he is now deterred from future mistakes. He is on 
notice, as are the rest of the officers in his department, that violations 
will be met with significant sanctions. The entire department has a real 
incentive to do it right the next time around. Judge, the Fourth 
Amendment is in fact better protected in this case than under the old, 
tried, and failed approach of Mapp. 
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, may I be heard? 
Judge: Mr. Bishop, I’m pretty sure I know what you are going to say 
but my mind is made up. I am going to do something that may well draw 
rebuke from my colleagues at the appellate level. I am denying the 
defense motion to suppress the evidence despite the Fourth Amendment 
violations that led to that evidence. 
Defense Counsel: Your Honor is forcing me to take a writ.265
 265. WITKIN & EPSTEIN, supra note 240, § 378(1).  
If the motion [to suppress evidence] is denied after a special hearing requested by the 
defendant, the defendant may obtain pretrial review by petitioning for a writ of 
mandamus . . . .  
. . . . 
  In felony cases, the appellate court reviews the action of the superior court at the 
special hearing, rather than that of the magistrate at the preliminary examination. Thus, 
the defendant, in seeking review by writ, should furnish the appellate court with a 
transcript of the evidence presented at the special hearing and advise the court of the 
motion and the grounds on which it was made. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). However, this requirement is not applied where “(a) the motion was 
submitted on the basis of the preliminary examination transcript (which had furnished the basis for 
the P.C. 1538.5 motion at the special hearing), and (b) the defendant specifically described the 
illegally seized evidence.” Id. 
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Judge: I am fully aware of that, Mr. Bishop. You must do what you 
must do. 
I will make the following factual findings to assist in appellate 
review. I find based on the sworn affidavit of Detective Todrick that his 
errors in entering the side yard of Mr. Johnson’s residence, looking 
through the garage window, and then entering the garage were 
unintentionally violative of the Fourth Amendment. Further, I find the 
sanctions imposed by Detective Todrick’s department, which included 
suspension without pay, twenty hours of search and seizure training, and 
a requirement that Detective Todrick successfully complete a search and 
seizure examination, convince me that Detective Todrick and others in 
his department are less likely to engage in conduct that violates the 
Fourth Amendment in the future. 
Therefore I am denying the defense motion to exclude the materials 
taken from the garage and order that a time be set for trial. 
C. The Appellate Argument 
The Third California Appellate District. Justice E.A. Harris 
presiding, with Justices Anthony McPeak and Edith May. 
Clerk: The People of the State of California v. Robert Johnson, on a 
writ brought by Robert Johnson. 
Justice Harris: Mr. Bishop, welcome and good morning. I 
understand we have a rather intriguing question before us today. 
Defense Counsel Bishop: “Intriguing” is certainly one view of this 
matter, Your Honor. However, from my perspective there is no 
legitimate question before this court. As I have set forth in my brief, the 
trial judge erred in agreeing with the prosecutor’s unprecedented notion 
that evidence seized in direct violation of the Fourth Amendment should 
not be suppressed. 
Justice Harris: I’m well aware of the question before this court, Mr. 
Bishop, and I must confess that when I first read the briefs I was very 
skeptical of the actions of the trial court. On further reflection, however, 
I believe it is a question certainly worthy of further discussion. 
Defense Counsel: I appreciate the Court’s intrigue and respectfully 
suggest that the sophistry suggested by the prosecutor be aired out in 
academic pieces and law review articles.266 We are in the real world, and 
 266. In addition to those scholars who use academic pieces and law review articles to criticize 
the exclusionary rule, a number of scholars also defend the rule. One of those most notable scholars 
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in the real world, the fruits of illegal searches and seizures are 
excluded.267 The Supreme Court set it forth in Mapp v. Ohio and has not 
varied from its course for four decades.268
Justice Harris: Counsel, this Court deals in the real world every 
day. This Court makes difficult decisions every day. Often times these 
decisions have significant effects on the lives of the people before this 
Court. I consider the actions of the trial judge in this instance to be 
carefully considered, and his actions will be scrutinized with care. So, I 
suggest that we turn to a thoughtful discussion of this serious question. 
First of all, Mr. Bishop, the Supreme Court has varied regarding the 
exclusionary rule’s application, a fact of which you should be well 
aware. Now, as we begin our discussion of this important issue, Mr. 
Bishop, isn’t the state correct in asserting that the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct269 and, in this case, given 
the direct sanctions and re-education of the erring officer, won’t he be 
motivated to perform better in the future? 
Defense Counsel: The Mapp Court imposed the exclusionary rule on 
state courts not  only to deter police violations of the Fourth Amendment 
but also to preserve judicial integrity.270 This latter goal would be 
completely sacrificed if illegally obtained evidence is allowed in a court 
of law. 
Justice McPeak: You’ve picked an interesting place to begin your 
argument, Counsel. Are you suggesting that judicial integrity is a 
foundational cornerstone of the exclusionary rule? Because from my 
reading of Mapp, it appears to be on the periphery, while the focus is 
squarely on police deterrence.271
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, allowing ill-begotten evidence to be 
admitted into court taints and sullies our system of justice. 
is Yale Kamisar. See Yale Kamisar, Law and Truth: Debate: Exclusionary Rules: In Defense of the 
Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119 (2003). 
 267. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
 268. See supra Part II.B. Defense Counsel Bishop’s statement here is not completely correct. 
While the Supreme Court has kept the exclusionary rule since 1961, it has varied considerably 
regarding the situations in which it will apply. 
 269. See supra Part II.A. 
 270. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (stating that the Court’s decision gives “to the courts . . . that 
judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice”). However, given the Court’s 
concern with the police violating Fourth Amendment rights, it is clear that the main focus of the 
Mapp opinion was that something was needed in order to deter future violations of the Fourth 
Amendment by the police. See discussion supra Part II.A.  
 271. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660. See supra notes 72–87 and accompanying text for a summary of 
the Court’s decision in Mapp. 
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Justice McPeak: Counsel, some might suggest that excluding highly 
incriminating and probative evidence of a defendant’s guilt taints and 
sullies our justice system. Be that as it may, let me ask again: is it your 
position that judicial integrity is the primary goal of the exclusionary 
rule? 
Defense Counsel: Judicial integrity was certainly an important 
consideration . . . 
Justice McPeak: I sense you are hedging, Counsel. Wouldn’t you 
agree that the Supreme Court’s prime motivation for ordering exclusion 
in Mapp was to deter police from search and seizure violations? 
Defense Counsel: I would agree that deterrence was the prime 
motivation but that the concern about judicial integrity was significant as 
well. 
Justice McPeak: Thank you, Counsel. Let’s talk about deterrence. 
One of the time-honored criticisms of the exclusionary rule is that it does 
not impose direct sanctions against the offending officer and, thus, there 
is no great disincentive for police noncompliance.272 How do you 
respond to that criticism? 
Defense Counsel: It has been said that the police are advocates in 
the criminal justice system and are very much concerned in seeing that 
the people they arrest are convicted.273 There is an “us against them” 
mentality. Given that adversarial role, having evidence excluded is 
hurtful to their position and thus creates a very real incentive to comply 
with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment to avoid losing that evidence 
and ultimately the conviction.274
Justice May: You make a good argument, Counsel. It is a real slap 
in the face of law enforcement to lose convictions. Oftentimes officers 
have put themselves at risk to secure the very evidence that is later being 
excluded. However, wouldn’t you also agree that there may be instances 
where the police simply want to get drugs or weapons off the street? 
 272. Perrin et al., supra note 11 at 675–76 (discussing how the sanction of exclusion “falls 
most directly on the prosecutor” instead of the offending officer). 
 273. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (“The judicial warrant has a 
significant role to play in that it provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a 
more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement 
officer ‘engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’” (quoting Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948))). 
 274. Perrin et al., supra note 11 at 679–80 (noting that the police officers in Orfield’s study 
felt a personal sense of disappointment at the loss of a potential conviction). The responses of the 
officers in Orfield’s study are significant in that, if sincere, they demonstrate an incentive for the 
police to comply with the Fourth Amendment. 
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Defense Counsel: There may be instances in which officers have a 
stronger incentive to get the contraband off the street, but I’m hard-
pressed to believe that officers who work hard to gain evidence, 
sometimes even at the risk of their own safety, are disinterested in 
securing convictions. They very much care, and when a court throws out 
hard-earned, incriminating evidence, they feel it both personally and 
professionally. 
Justice McPeak: Your observations sound anecdotal, Counsel. 
Nonetheless, you would agree that exclusion is not a direct sanction 
against the offending officers, and while they may be chagrined at having 
evidence excluded and perhaps losing convictions, they suffer no direct 
professional consequences. It seems to me that direct sanctions would 
create a better incentive to comply with the law. 
Defense Counsel: I would agree with your proposition that direct 
sanctions would be a strong motivator. However, as I set forth in my 
brief, direct sanctions will not work because they would have a chilling 
effect on law enforcement.275 If an officer is concerned that even 
unintentional error may result in fines, suspension, or even termination, 
the officer may be reluctant to do the job he or she was hired to do. 
Your Honors, the exclusionary rule strikes a delicate balance. On the 
one hand, it provides an incentive for law enforcement to obey the law 
by threatening the convictions they seek and care a great deal about. On 
the other hand, the potential sanction is not so severe that it might 
impede an officer’s ability to do his or her job. 
Justice McPeak: Mr. Bishop, according to some of the empirical 
studies cited in opposing counsel’s brief, there is little to suggest that 
exclusion of evidence really works a disincentive on law enforcement. In 
fact, the studies tend to indicate that on occasion the offending officer 
doesn’t even learn that his conduct was found wanting and that the 
evidence was excluded. If that’s the case, how does the rule deter? 
Defense Counsel: The People have put great stock in some of the 
studies they rely on. I would like to point out that the majority of the 
authors of those studies cautioned specifically that definitive conclusions 
in evaluating the human motivation in such complex settings are very 
difficult and uncertain.276 Furthermore, two of the three studies cited by 
 275. See Perrin, et al., supra note 11, at 681 (“Ninety-five percent of the responding officers 
said that if victims could sue officers, it would have a chilling effect on the officers’ ability to do 
their job.”). 
 276. See Oaks, supra note 136, for one author’s remarks concerning the difficulties in 
understanding the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent. See also Elkins v. United 
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the prosecutor found that the exclusionary rule does in fact deter officers 
from illegal conduct.277 That being said, I don’t know how much faith 
we can put in these studies. In my considerable experience, the police are 
very aware when evidence is suppressed. And, I might add, they are 
always upset. 
Justice Harris: Once again, Mr. Bishop, while this court appreciates 
your considerable experience, your observations are anecdotal, bordering 
on gratuitous. I would like to turn your attention to another problem that 
I see with the exclusionary rule. In fact, it is a problem that has surfaced 
in the very case before us today. The problem is disproportionality.278 In 
this case the officer’s error was walking into the defendant’s backyard 
and looking through a garage window, which was in clear violation of 
Mr. Johnson’s Fourth Amendment rights. The sanction is the lost 
prosecution of a person allegedly engaged in the manufacture of illegal, 
highly addictive, and dangerous drugs. Would exclusion of the 
methamphetamine lab and all the contraband found in that lab be 
disproportionate to the nature of the police error?279
Defense Counsel: The violation of the sanctity of the home 
constitutes a serious breach of the Fourth Amendment. The home and 
those places just outside the home where the family engages in intimate 
States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960) (“Since as a practical matter it is never easy to prove a negative, it 
is hardly likely that conclusive factual data could ever be assembled. For much the same reason, it 
cannot positively be demonstrated that enforcement of the criminal law is either more or less 
effective under either rule.”). 
 277. See Orfield, supra note 11, at 1054; Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 11, at 358 (noting 
that the exclusionary rule has a weak deterrent effect). 
 278. See Lawrence Buser, Drug Bust Is Erased by Judge—Says Suspect With 33 Pounds of 
Cocaine Not Nervous Enough, COM. APPEAL, May 21, 2005, at B1. Buser cited a recent case in 
which an officer pulled over a car for speeding, noticed that the driver seemed unusually nervous, 
requested and obtained written permission to search his car, and then discovered thirty-three pounds 
of cocaine. However, the judge, after watching the dashboard video of the incident, ruled that the 
cocaine was inadmissible because the suspect was not “nervous enough to become a suspicious 
character worthy of further investigation” and that the officer’s “detention was a process designed to 
exploit the underlying traffic stop.” Id. 
 279. See Yale Kamisar, “Comparative Reprehensibility” and the Fourth Amendment 
Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1987). Some critics argue, 
When proponents of the proportionality approach (or “inadvertent” police error 
exception) complain that rigid application of the exclusionary rule offends the idea of 
proportionality, they have in mind those instances when an “honest” or “inadvertent” 
police blunder affords a guilty defendant—any guilty defendant—an unacceptable 
windfall. These critics of the exclusionary rule point to the disparity or disproportion 
between the police error and the “drastic” remedy of exclusion. 
Id. at 7 (emphasis added); see also infra notes 281–83 and accompanying text. 
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activities are among the most protected and private areas imaginable.280 
Surely the court is not suggesting that Detective Todrick’s violation was 
merely of a technical nature. 
Justice Harris: Bear with me, Counsel. Would you agree with me 
that illegal police behavior can be characterized on different levels of 
fault? For instance, in the Mapp case the police fully recognized that they 
needed a search warrant to enter Mapp’s home, but they entered without 
a warrant anyway.281 Then, while engaged in their illegal and invasive 
search of her home, they compounded their error by denying Mapp 
access to her attorney who was present but kept from her.282 As a result 
of the illegal police conduct, they found several allegedly pornographic 
pictures.283 So it seems we had terrible, perhaps even egregious police 
conduct resulting in the seizure of some dirty pictures. I’ve often 
wondered in the Mapp case itself, if the evidence found had involved a 
murder or rape instead of dirty pictures, would the Court have suppressed 
that evidence. Extreme police conduct, minimal offense. In the case 
before us here today, Detective Todrick incorrectly, but unintentionally 
thought he was justified in entering through the gate, looking into the 
garage, and then entering the garage. As a result he discovered an entire 
methamphetamine lab. While his conduct violated Johnson’s expectation 
of privacy, it was nowhere near the extreme or knowingly violative 
misconduct in Mapp. In addition to nonegregious police misconduct, we 
have here a very serious crime. Would it be disproportionate, Mr. 
Bishop, to exclude an entire methamphetamine lab because on this error? 
Defense Counsel: The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable 
search and seizures. It does not distinguish between more unreasonable 
as opposed to less unreasonable search and seizures but prohibits them 
completely. 
 280. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (holding that aiming a thermal-
imaging device, that was not in general public use, at the home constituted a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment). In protecting the home as a sanctuary, Justice Scalia, writing 
for the Court, stated that “[t]o be sure, the homeowner has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
concerning what takes place within the home, and the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
physical invasions of the home should apply to their functional equivalent.” Id. at 44. 
 281. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644 (1961). When the officers arrived at Dollree 
Mapp’s house they demanded entry, but were refused because they did not have a warrant. Because 
the police did not have Mapp’s consent and there were no exigent circumstances that would justify 
entry into her home without a warrant, they undertook surveillance of the home. After waiting a few 
more hours, the police forced their way into Mapp’s home, this time claiming to have a warrant. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 645. 
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Justice Harris: Precisely. There is no gradation. Rather, it is a one-
size-fits-all approach. So regardless of the level of police misconduct, the 
same remedy is applied. Wouldn’t you agree that this approach can and 
does lead to disproportionality? 
Defense Counsel: Are we now to distinguish between greater or 
lesser unreasonable searches? I’m not at all certain the Framers of the 
Bill of Rights or the Mapp Court had that in mind. The police conduct is 
either violative of the Fourth Amendment or it is not, and, if it is, the 
fruits of that violation should be excluded. 
Justice Harris: It seems to me though, that there clearly are 
gradations of police misconduct and that excluding an entire meth lab 
because of unintentional, nonegregious error, such as we have before us 
here, seems disproportionate to the nature of the error. 
Justice McPeak: Excuse me, Mr. Bishop, but I want to follow-up on 
Justice Harris’ question. It has been set forth in the state’s brief that 
officers whose error is unintentional, as compared to those whose 
conduct is knowingly violative, would be good candidates for additional 
search and seizure training, and that once the training is completed, they 
would perform better the next time around. Conversely, an officer who 
knows he or she is violating a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights and 
does so with impunity most likely will not benefit from further training. 
If this proposition is true, shouldn’t we look more closely at the nature of 
the police conduct? 
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I’m not willing to concede that we 
can distinguish between levels of police misconduct or that additional 
search and seizure training will deter misconduct. Furthermore, if we 
attempt to determine whether an officer knowingly violated the Fourth 
Amendment, how would we go about it? Wouldn’t we be forced to probe 
the subjective intent of the officer?284 That would seem to open up a 
whole series of problems including a motivation for officers to perjure 
themselves in order to avoid the type of direct sanction the state is 
suggesting.285
 284. The Supreme Court has struggled with whether it is appropriate, or even possible, to 
probe the subjective intent of an officer’s mind. Compare Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 
(1996) (holding that pretextual traffic stops are acceptable because courts cannot probe an officer’s 
subjective intent), with South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976) (holding that an 
impounded vehicle may be inventoried as long as it is done according to routine administrative 
caretaking functions so that the police cannot use the inventory as a way around the probable cause 
requirements). 
 285. See Orfield, supra note 11, at 1050 (stating that almost all officers surveyed admitted that 
police occasionally lie in suppression hearings). Thus, if officers lie now to avoid the indirect 
1CALDWELL.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006 12:36:00 PM 
1] Fixing the Constable’s Blunder: The Exclusionary Rule 
 57 
 
Justice May: You make a good point, Counsel. The two significant 
problems I see with the state’s proposition are an increased incentive for 
the police to commit perjury to protect themselves from direct sanction 
and the chilling effect on police officers as they go about their jobs. 
Defense Counsel: Precisely. Part of the rationale for this radical 
proposal suggested by the state is that the exclusionary rule creates an 
incentive for the police to commit perjury in order to avoid exclusion of 
evidence. Yet by going to these more direct sanctions, the motivation for 
officers to lie is tremendously enhanced. If, indeed, police perjury is 
currently a concern, it will be a full-blown problem if we radically 
increase the incentive to lie. An officer faced with the threat of losing a 
week’s pay, or, worse yet, his job, will really be backed into a corner. 
Under such circumstances we are creating a compelling incentive for 
perjury. For this reason alone, the state’s proposal should be rejected. 
I would also like to follow up on Justice May’s observation about the 
chilling effect this proposal would have on law enforcement. Officers 
would most likely go about their jobs differently if concerned with the 
possibility of suspension or termination. There would be second-
guessing and equivocation. I am suggesting to this court that an officer 
concerned about such external matters will be dramatically less effective 
in the field. 
Justice Harris: Don’t we want officers to be more thoughtful and 
even protective of individual liberties as they go about their jobs? 
Defense Counsel: Of course we do, but we don’t want officers so 
overly concerned with personal sanction that they become virtually 
ineffective in going about their jobs. 
Justice Harris: That is certainly a question worthy of asking 
opposing counsel. I see we are almost out of time so let me turn to a last 
area of inquiry. Given the studies as well as pronouncements from 
individual Supreme Court Justices suggesting there is scant evidence that 
the rule deters the police,286 shouldn’t we look at other approaches? 
Aren’t we obligated to try something else? 
sanction of exclusion they will undoubtedly be more likely to lie if a direct sanction were imposed 
upon them. See also Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 725 (stating that many officers minimized the 
extent of police perjury that they had witnessed, while a few officers claimed to have heard of police 
perjury as many as ten, twenty, or even fifty times). 
 286. See supra Part II.C for a summary of the lack of evidence that the exclusionary rule 
actually deters police misconduct. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 
416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that there is “no empirical evidence to support the 
claim that the rule actually deters illegal conduct of law enforcement officials”). 
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Defense Counsel: If these studies are to be taken at face value—and, 
as I’ve already said, I do not subscribe to those conclusions—but if they 
are to be taken at face value, and we do need to rethink how we as a 
society enforce the Fourth Amendment, then let us go about it in a more 
deliberative and thoughtful manner than suggested by the prosecutor. 
Instead of some half-baked response because we face the exclusion of 
some serious evidence in this one case, let’s allow our legislators to take 
action or let’s allow our Supreme Court to strike out on some new 
course. Not like this. 
Justice Harris: Thank you, Counsel. 
Defense Counsel: May I conclude? 
Justice Harris: I’m sorry Mr. Bishop, you are out of time. We 
would like to hear from the state. 
Ms. Alper, good morning. You and your office have undertaken 
quite a challenge. The exclusionary rule has been one of the mainstays of 
the criminal justice system for nearly a century.287 Its operation is a 
virtual given: the police err and the evidence is out.288 It seems settled 
and fixed. While there may be instances when the rule exacts a painful 
cost, isn’t it for the most part reasonably effective at keeping law 
enforcement in line? Is this something that we can, or even should, go 
back and recast? 
Prosecutor Alper: Justice Harris, I’m glad you choose to start here. 
We need to acknowledge that the exclusionary rule has become part of 
the fixed universe of the criminal justice system. Two generations of 
lawyers have been educated on the inviolate nature of exclusion in the 
event of police error.289 There is typically no discussion of whether any 
particular exclusion works to society’s benefit—we simply argue at 
suppression hearing whether there was police error and if so the fruits of 
the error are simply out. It is a knee-jerk reaction. What I would like this 
court to do is think long and hard about the exclusionary rule, why we 
instituted it in the first place, and whether it does what it was supposed to 
do. 
I realize this is bold and very unusual, but I also know that any long 
held maxim should be able to withstand rigorous scrutiny and 
 287. See supra Part II. The Court adopted the federal exclusionary rule in 1914, over 90 years 
ago. Furthermore, the Court adopted the federal rule for use in state courts in 1961. Therefore, the 
exclusionary rule, whether used in federal courts only or in both federal and state courts, has been 
part of the criminal justice system for 92 years. 
 288. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
 289. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
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examination. Your Honor, I do not believe the exclusionary rule can 
withstand such scrutiny. 
Justice Harris: Well before we even get to a scrutiny of the viability 
of the rule, it seems to me there is the threshold question of whether this 
court and the trial court are even proper venues for what you are seeking. 
After all, it seems to me that you are asking us to depart from the United 
States Supreme Court in its Mapp opinion. 
Prosecutor: Neither in Mapp nor in any subsequent opinion 
exploring the parameters of Mapp has the Supreme Court ever mandated 
that the sole or exclusive remedy for police error was exclusion of the 
evidence that was the byproduct of that error.290 In fact, in his 
concurring opinion Justice Black states that he agrees with the majority’s 
implication “that the federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the 
Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which 
Congress might negate.”291 Furthermore, in adopting the good faith 
exception in Leon, the Court stated that “[t]he Fourth Amendment 
contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained 
in violation of its commands.”292 I believe Mapp is a case where the 
Court, exasperated with the police continually and knowingly running 
roughshod over the rights of citizens, took the best course of action they 
could identify at the time.293 Over the forty-five years since that 
decision, we have had calls from members of the Court to consider 
reexamination of the rule if evidence exclusion was not accomplishing 
the goal of police deterrence.294
 290. See supra notes 92, 250, 252, and 256. 
 291. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 661 (Black, J., concurring) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 
39–40 (1949)). 
 292. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984). 
 293. See supra notes 72–87 and accompanying text for a summary of the Court’s opinion in 
Mapp. 
 294. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting a gradual trend in Supreme 
Court decisions to admit illegally seized evidence); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 
U.S. 388, 414 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“If an effective alternative remedy is available, 
concern for official observance of the law does not require adherence to the exclusionary rule.”) 
(emphasis added). Chief Justice Burger also implied that he would be willing to consider another 
approach when he stated that he “would hesitate to abandon [the exclusionary rule] until some 
meaningful substitute is developed.” Id. at 415. The Chief Justice also suggested that perhaps, if the 
Court would not take action, Congress should step in. Id. at 421 (“Reasonable and effective 
substitutes can be formulated if Congress would take the lead . . . .”); see also Irvine v. California, 
347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954) (“Rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing 
official, while it may, and likely will, release the wrong-doing defendant. It deprives society of its 
remedy against one lawbreaker because he has been pursued by another. It protects one against 
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Justice McPeak: But shouldn’t that decision come from the 
legislature? 
Prosecutor: The exclusionary rule was a creation of the judiciary. 
Can’t the judiciary change or modify what it wrought? 
Justice McPeak: We are a state appellate court, and yet you are 
suggesting that we can overrule a decision of the United States Supreme 
Court. 
Prosecutor: It would be foolish and fruitless to suggest that. Rather, 
I am suggesting that to follow the course I’ve outlined in my brief in no 
way overrules Mapp. Mapp has never been absolute. If the reason for the 
existence of the exclusionary rule does not reflect the realities of the 
criminal justice system, then courts have the power to so find. 
If this court in this instance believes that because Detective Todrick 
was sanctioned and reeducated he will be deterred from future Fourth 
Amendment violations, then we have accomplished everything the Court 
in Mapp sought to accomplish without excluding the probative 
incriminating evidence. 
Justice May: Can you cite to any other instances where a lower 
court broke from long standing Supreme Court precedent because the 
lower court determined that the policy was wrong? 
Prosecutor: I think we have a very good example in the Supreme 
Court’s Nix v. Williams decision. In Nix the Court recognized, without 
any prompting from higher courts, that “the ‘vast majority’ of all courts, 
both state and federal, recognize[d] an inevitable discovery exception to 
the exclusionary rule.”295 Local courts, on their own initiative, carved 
out an exception. They broke from Mapp because they did not feel that 
the goals of Mapp would be served.296
If I might, I would like to turn to the rationale that gave rise to the 
exclusionary rule. As I’ve set forth in my brief, our society pays a 
tremendous price for the rule—this price mandates that the reason behind 
the rule be sound. Now, despite the protestations of Mr. Bishop, the 
whom incriminating evidence is discovered, but does nothing to protect innocent persons who are 
the victims of illegal but fruitless searches.”). 
 295. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440 (1984). 
 296. See United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051, 1053 (4th Cir. 1970) (holding that 
illegally obtained evidence was properly admitted because the police would have learned of the 
information regardless of the illegality); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1963) 
(relying on the Court’s attenuation of the taint doctrine in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 
(1963), and the fact that the evidence would have inevitably been discovered in holding that the 
exclusionary rule’s application was not warranted). 
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reason for the exclusionary rule is, and has always been, to deter the 
police from future violations of the Fourth Amendment. 
Justice May: That’s correct, Counsel, and for the police—these 
advocates of law and order—to have evidence of guilt excluded is a great 
disincentive to violate the rules of search and seizure. 
Prosecutor: With all due respect, Justice May, I disagree. I will 
acknowledge, however, that the police are advocates in the criminal 
justice system and that they rightfully see themselves pitted against 
criminals.297 Moreover, one of the ways to succeed in that struggle is not 
only to make arrests but also obtain convictions. I believe, however, that 
there is a serious disconnect between arrest and conviction. From my 
understanding of police behavior, it appears that once the police make an 
arrest and gather evidence they feel their job is done.298 From that point 
forward they feel powerless, and if evidence is excluded or convictions 
are not forthcoming, they feel that is due to the vagaries of the rules of 
search and seizure, as well as the actions of the lawyers and judges 
involved.299 This feeling of powerlessness is exacerbated because often 
the officers that are involved are not even informed whether evidence has 
been suppressed.300 Because of that disconnect, the operation of the rule 
works only in an indirect way on the police. 
 297. See supra notes 273–74 and accompanying text. 
 298. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 137 (1954) (“The case is made, so far as the police 
are concerned, when they announce that they have arrested their man.”). 
 299. Id. at 147 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Police feel powerless because they do not have a 
mechanical process by which to adhere. Rather, police arrests often depend upon the actions of 
judges and lawyers and how they interpret the rules of search and seizure on a case-by-case basis. 
Frankfurter stated the following: 
Since due process is not a mechanical yardstick, it does not afford mechanical answers. In 
applying the Due Process Clause judicial judgment is involved in an empiric process in 
the sense that results are not predetermined or mechanically ascertainable. But that is a 
very different thing from conceiving the results as ad hoc decisions in the opprobrious 
sense of ad hoc. Empiricism implies judgment upon variant situations by the wisdom of 
experience. Ad hocness in adjudication means treating a particular case by itself and not 
in relation to the meaning of a course of decisions and the guides they serve for the 
future. There is all the difference in the world between disposing of a case as though it 
were a discrete instance and recognizing it as part of the process of judgment, taking its 
place in relation to what went before and further cutting a channel for what is to come. 
Id. 
 300. See Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 722–25 (“If the exclusionary rule is to have any 
specific deterrent effect, the offending officers must be apprised of the ruling and the reasons for 
it.”). As evidenced by the Ventura County study, police officers rarely received any formal 
communication concerning the outcome of the suppression hearing and “instead frequently learned 
of the ruling only if the officer happened to be in court when the ruling was announced.” Id. 
1CALDWELL.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006 12:36:00 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
62 
 
Justice May: Excuse me, Counsel, but I noted your reference to 
various studies in your brief, and I am skeptical that anyone can produce 
definitive information about whether officers do or do not care about 
evidence being excluded and convictions being lost. My common sense 
tells me that it does matter, that the officers do care what happens. And if 
they do care, and evidence is excluded and perhaps an otherwise guilty 
person walks free, that will be a reason for the officer to better perform 
his job the next time around. 
Prosecutor: Justice May, the empirical data does not support your 
conclusion. While acknowledging that testing in such a complex arena is 
difficult and may well have a subjective component, it is the best 
evidence we have for evaluating the effects of the rule. But as I was 
about to say, for the police to be truly motivated to not violate the laws of 
search and seizure, there must be a more direct method of getting their 
attention and requiring them to do their jobs within the law.301
Justice May: Counsel, I am very concerned with relying on the 
“findings” of these studies that by your own account contain a level of 
subjectiveness. But let’s agree to disagree on that and turn to this 
business of direct sanctions. I’m worried about the chilling effect this 
would have on our officers. Wouldn’t we be creating a situation where 
police officers, concerned that they may be fined, suspended, or even 
fired, will be less effective in how they go about their jobs? 
Prosecutor: There is no question in my mind that if an officer faces 
the possibility of being monetarily sanctioned, he will have a greater 
incentive to do his job within the law. But I will not agree that he will be 
compromised or somehow less effective in going about his job. Let’s 
step back a moment. Being a police officer in our complicated society is 
a demanding job. It requires courage as well as knowledge. We demand a 
lot of our cops, but we do not demand more than what they are capable 
of. We hire men and women who we believe will be courageous, and we 
train them so that they will be knowledgeable. All we are asking is that 
they do the job they were hired and trained to do. 
 301. See Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 683. Heffernan and Lovely believed that “direct 
sanctions against offending officers would trigger doubts about police intrusions that were legal, 
thus inhibiting vigorous law enforcement and bringing about uncertainty and inaction on the part of 
the police.” Id. Thus, they concluded that indirect sanctions were sufficient to deter illegal police 
misconduct; “[h]owever, despite the authors’ conclusions, the large number of unwitting violators 
(34%) shows the extent to which the rule can not operate as a deterrent. There can be no deterrence 
in the absence of police understanding the law.” Id. 
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Justice May: What if they are in a difficult position and the path or 
correct course of conduct is not readily apparent? Given the possibility of 
sanction, won’t they be more likely to step back instead of going ahead 
and doing their job? 
Prosecutor: If the course of conduct is not clear, perhaps we are 
better served if they step back. I don’t see that as compromising; I see 
that as an officer doing his job right. 
Justice Harris: Following along the same lines, the problem I see 
with direct sanctions is policy perjury. Some of the studies you rely on 
mention that police perjury is a problem under the current rule, which 
you maintain offers only an indirect sanction. If we institute a more 
direct sanction aren’t we opening the door to even more police perjury? 
Prosecutor: I, too, am concerned about police perjury; and yes, I 
agree with your concern that this more direct sanction may well increase 
the instances of perjury. 
Justice May: Are you conceding that police perjury will become 
more prevalent with more direct sanction? 
Prosecutor: It may, although I have no way of knowing. Intuitively 
it seems that may be an adverse result. But I do know that we already 
have some police perjury—none of us can know to what extent—and 
what I also know is that it would be far better to stomach some additional 
instances of police perjury rather than continuing to exclude highly 
probative and incriminating evidence of guilt. 
Justice May: Ms. Alper, your comment begs the question and 
introduces some gratuitous grandstanding into the argument. 
Prosecutor: I am willing to concede that one of the consequences of 
my position may be more police perjury, but I disagree that my comment 
was gratuitous. What this court must do is weigh the competing 
advantages and disadvantages of either staying the course and resorting 
once again to the tried and failed exclusion approach or setting forth on 
an alternative path that may well deter the police from future violations 
while admitting probative evidence of guilt. 
Justice Brandeis praised our federal system of government because it 
allowed the states autonomy within the larger system to experiment with 
new ideas. This states-as-laboratories idea has been successful in 
implementing unemployment compensation, minimum-wage laws, 
public financing of political campaigns, and prohibitions against 
discrimination in housing and employment.302 Why not here? Are we so 
 302. See supra note 213. 
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taken with the exclusionary rule that we won’t even consider some other 
way of enforcing and protecting the Fourth Amendment. 
The proposal I set forth may create more police perjury, prove to 
have too much of a chilling effect on the police, or have other unforeseen 
consequences. None of us will know until we try it. 
Justice May: Counsel, your comments suggest to me that you are 
willing to open a Pandora’s Box of both foreseeable and unforeseeable 
potential problems. Given the uncertainties, would it even be responsible 
to take the action you propose? 
Prosecutor: Justice May, I don’t pretend to have all the answers. I 
do know that the detective in this case will be in a better position to 
follow the Fourth Amendment the next time he is confronted with a 
search and seizure situation. I also know that excluding the evidence of 
Mr. Johnson’s meth lab will serve no purpose whatsoever except to allow 
a dope manufacturer and dealer to be returned to the streets to go about 
his illegal business. 
Justice McPeak: I suspect you are right about this detective in this 
case, but I am disturbed that in the next case, or the one after that, in an 
attempt to avoid exclusion the effected police agency may discipline its 
offending officer simply to get around exclusion. What I mean to say is 
that the department is not really interested in deterrence but only in 
avoiding exclusion of the evidence. I’m concerned about police agency 
manipulation. 
Prosecutor: That’s why it is necessary that the judge at the 
suppression hearing be convinced that the efforts undertaken by the 
agency are genuine and undertaken with deterrence as the goal before 
admitting the evidence. 
Justice McPeak: Well, then aren’t we putting tremendous power in 
the hands of the judge to evaluate departmental policy? 
Prosecutor: Only as it relates to the actions undertaken with regard 
to the involved officers. 
Justice McPeak: I foresee potential problems when a police agency 
brings pressure to bear on a judge in a particularly volatile case. 
Prosecutor: I would suggest that a judge forced to exclude highly 
incriminating evidence because of police error is already under 
tremendous pressure under the current rule. 
Justice Harris: Ms. Alper, one of the time honored criticisms of the 
exclusionary rule is that these persons whose Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated, but whose cases were never filed, have no practical 
redress. Does your proposal affect those cases? 
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Prosecutor: No it does not. Although in preparing for my argument 
here today, I have come across a number of thoughtful and practical 
approaches that address your concern. However, unlike what I propose in 
this instance, those approaches would require legislative action. One 
proposal in particular set forth a civil administrative remedy modeled 
after the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, which creates 
civil administrative remedies for discriminatory housing or employment 
practices.303
But, again, that would require legislative action and is far beyond 
what I am seeking from this court in this case. 
Justice Harris: I see your time has expired, Ms. Alper, but I can’t 
get over my lingering concern that what you are seeking is beyond our 
authority. The exclusionary rule was a creation of the United States 
Supreme Court; who are we to act in defiance? 
Prosecutor: May I respond? 
Justice Harris: Go ahead. 
Prosecutor: Far from acting in defiance, I believe this court would 
be acting in accord with Supreme Court precedent. First, the Court has 
never said exclusion was the sole remedy.304 Second, just as the Court in 
the recent Patane opinion ruled that exclusion was not appropriate when 
the violation stemmed from Fifth Amendment error, exclusion is only 
appropriate when it fulfills the goal of deterrence from Fourth 
Amendment violation.305 In this instance there is no reason to exclude 
this evidence. 
Thank you for your time. 
Justice Harris: Well, on behalf of Justice May and Justice McPeak, 
I would like to thank both Defense Counsel Bishop and Prosecutor Alper 
for arguments well made. There are timeliness issues with this case, so 
you can expect our opinion within the week. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The arguments have been made. The lines have been carefully 
drawn. The prosecutor’s bold proposal that exclusion is not necessary 
 303. See Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 743–55 (proposing that the exclusionary rule be limited 
in scope to apply only to evidence obtained because of intentional or willful police misconduct, and 
that those individuals who have evidence seized as a result of reckless, negligent, or innocent 
conduct have access to a civil administrative process that would include the availability of monetary 
recovery from the offending officers or their employer). 
 304. See supra notes 92, 250, and 252. 
 305. See supra notes 126 and 252. 
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even in the face of clear Fourth Amendment error has been examined 
from every side. Will it prevail? 
Is this such a far fetched scenario? The Court has indeed left the door 
open. And if we are convinced that this very costly exclusionary rule is 
not accomplishing what it was designed for, can we not move beyond it? 
Perhaps a bold and innovative prosecutor supported by her office can 
push her initiative on a trial judge. Perhaps a trial judge, running the risk 
of appellate rebuke, can pick up the challenge and carry it forward. Is it 
not time to push past the tried and frustrating course that continues to 
carve out exception after exception in order to avoid the rule’s draconian 
effect? Is it not time to heed Justice Blackmun’s words and recognize 
that “the exclusionary rule is subject to change in light of changing 
judicial understanding about the effects of the rule outside the confines 
of the courtroom”?306 Is it not time to put into action Brandeis’ theory 
“that a single courageous State may, if its citizen’s choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments”? 307 Is it not 
time? 
 306. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 307. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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